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C HAP T E R 24 
Judicial Conduct and Professional 
Responsibility 
RICHARD J. VITA 
§24.1. Introduction. During the 1972 SURVEY year, the Supreme 
Judicial Court took signal action in the regulation of professional legal 
and judicial conduct by incorporating within its Rules of Court the 
substance of two ethical codes of the American Bar Association. The 
Code of Professional Responsibility, with some modification, has been 
incorporated by reference within Court Rule 3: 22; the Code of Judicial 
Conduct has been adopted as chapter 5 of the Court Rules. 
A. PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 
§24.2. The Code. The Code of Professional Responsibility was 
unanimously adopted by the House of Delegates of the American Bar 
Association on August 12, 1969.1 It is divided into three separate but 
interrelated parts: the Canons, the Ethical Considerations, and the Dis-
ciplinary Rules. The Preliminary Statement to the Code describes the 
purpose and function of each section: 
The Canons are statements of axiomatic norms, expressing in general 
terms the standards of professional conduct expected of lawyers in 
their relationships with the public, with the legal system, and with 
the legal profession. They embody the general concepts from which 
the Ethical Considerations and Disciplinary Rules are derived. 
The Ethical Considerations are aspirational in character and rep-
resent the objectives toward which every member of the profession 
should strive. They constitute a body of principles upon which the 
lawyer can rely for guidance in many specific situations. 
The Disciplinary Rules, unlike the Ethical Considerations, are 
mandatory in character. The Disciplinary Rules state the minimum 
level of conduct below which no lawyer can fall without being sub-
ject to disciplinary action.2 
RICHARD J. VITA is a staff attorney for the Massachusetts Bar Association. 
§24.2. 1 At this writing, codes based on the ABA Code are in force in 45 
states and the District of Columbia. Three other states, California, Montana, and 
South Oarolina have codes under consideration. Only Alabama and North Caro-
lina have taken no official action regarding adoption of the Code. 
2 Preamble and Preliminary Statement to ABA CODE of PROFESSIONAL 
RESPONSIBILITY at l. 
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The Supreme Judicial Court has adopted two of the three sections, 
the Canons and the Disciplinary Rules. The promulgation specified seven 
modifications of the Disciplinary Rules for application in Massachusetts. 
The Ethical Considerations were not incorporated within the Court Rules 
as such, but were designated as a body of principles upon which the 
Canons and the Disciplinary Rules are to be interpreted. The new Court 
Rule, known as the Canons of Ethics and Disciplinary Rules Regulating 
the Practice of Law, is effective for conduct occurring on or after October 
2, 1972.3 
§24.3. Canons of Ethics and related Disciplinary Rules. 
Canon 1: A lawyer shoold assist in maintaining the integ;ity and com-
petence of the legal profession. 
The Disciplinary Rules under Canon One are divided into three 
sections. The first is directed to the lawyer's obligation to assist the 
Supreme Judicial Court in enforcing the requirements for admission to 
the bar, including his own application as well as those of others.l The 
second disciplinary rule under Canon One defines the lawyer's obliga-
tion to refrain from personal misconduct.2 A lawyer is subject to dis-
ciplinary sanction for professional misconduct by violating any disciplinary 
rule relating to the nine Canons.3 Conduct which involves dishonesty, 
fraud, deceit, misrepresentation;4 or which is prejudicial to the adminis-
tration of justice;5 or which adversely reflects on one's fitness to prac-
tice,6 is prohibited and extends to non-professional as well as professional 
activities. 
The Court did not adopt the rule which prohibits a lawyer from en-
gaging in illegal conduct involving moral turpitude.7 The term "moral 
turpitude" is not easily susceptible of precise definition and for that reason 
is a doubtful standard for professional discipline.s Conduct which might 
be contemplated by the term, however, may well be the basis for dis-
cipline under alternate rules in this or other sections. 
The third rule under Canon One states that a lawyer possessing un-
privileged knowledge or evidence concerning a lawyer or a judge shall 
reveal such information upon request of the proper authorities.9 The 
3 Supreme Judicial Court Rule 3:22(3). 
§24.3. 1 DR 1-101. All citations to the text of the Code of Professional 
Responsibility are to the original ABA version unless otherwise indicated. Modifica-
tions 'appearing in the Massachusetts version are described with reference to the 
ABA text. 
2 DR 1-102. 
3 DR 1-102(A) (1) . 
.. DR 1-102(A) (4). 
5 DR 1-102(A)(5). 
6 DR 1-102(A)(6). 
7 DR 1-102(A)(3). 
8 See Report of Special Master No. 7631 at 16, Supreme Judicial Court (April 
13, 1972); Weckstein, Maintaining the Integrity and Competence of the Legal 
Profession, 48 Texas L. Rev. 267, 276 (1970). 
9 DR 1-103(B). 
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companion to this rule which was not adopted, required a lawyer possess-
ing unprivileged knowledge of a violation of the rule under Canon 
One prohibiting misconduct to report such knowledge to proper author-
ities.1O This provision has been criticized as being too harsh and likely 
to breed distrust among members of the bar, thereby creating a pro-
fession of informants.11 
Canon 2: A lawyer should assist the legal profession in fulfilling its 
duty to make legal counsel available. 
Although Canon Two is stated in positive terms, the ten Disciplinary 
Rules under it are proscriptive. The traditional prohibitions against pub-
licity, advertising and solicitation are set out in detail,12 A lawyer is 
prohibited from holding himself out publicly as a specialist unless speci-
fically permitted by one of the enumerated subsections.'3 One rule 
describes circumstances under which a lawyer may not accept employ-
ment.14 Another focuses on the reasons for which a lawyer mayor must 
withdraw from the representation of a client.15 Several other rules are 
concerned with fees for legal services.16 
In the latter area, a number of alterations of the original ABA Dis-
ciplinary Rules were effected. The rule which defines an excessive fee17 
was modified by making the measure of a fee the "definite and firm 
conviction" of a lawyer "of ordinary prudence experienced in the area 
of the law involved" rather than that merely of a lawyer "of ordinary 
prudence." Furthermore, to be within the purview of the rule, a fee 
must be subs.tantially in excess of a reasonable fee. This refined definition 
eliminates minor fee excesses as a disciplinary problem. The rule which 
prohibits charging a contingent fee for defending a client against a 
criminal charge18 was broadened by deletion of the criminal charge 
reference and substitution of a requirement of conformance to Supreme 
Judicial Court Rule 3:14; which sets out the limitations on contingent 
fees for all areas of law. 
The ABA version of the Code prohibits lawyers who are not associates 
in a firm or office from dividing a fee unless, among other reasons, "[t]he 
total fee of the lawyers does not clearly exceed reasonable compensation 
for all legal services they rendered the client."19 The Supreme Judicial 
Court deleted the word "clearly," thereby strengthening the protection 
of the client whose attorney has associated with other counsel. However, 
10 DR 1-103(A). 
11 See Report of Special Master, note 8 supra, at 17-19; Weckstein, note 8 supra, 
at 281-82; 1970 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §29.2. 
12 DR 2-101, 2-102, 2-103, 2-104. 
13 DR 2-105. 
14 DR 2-109. 
15 DR 2-110. 
16 DR 2-106, 2-107. 
17 DR 2-106(B). 
18 DR 2-106(C). 
19 DR 2-107(A) (3). 
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the Court did not adopt the section which required that the division 
of fees among lawyers be made in proportion to the services performed 
and responsibility assumed.2o Thus, the long standing practice of fee 
splitting in Massachusetts is preserved. 
A final modification of the Disciplinary Rules appears in a section 
dealing with a lawyer's participation in group legal service programs.21 
The original rule specifies certain types of group service activities with 
which a lawyer may cooperate, then includes in addition "[a]ny other 
non-profit organization that ... furnishes ... legal services to its ... 
beneficiaries, but only ... to the extent that controlling constitutional 
interpretation at the time of the rendition of the services requires the al-
lowance of such legal service activities .... "22 (Emphasis added). The 
Court omitted the italicized phrase, perhaps reasoning that it would be 
more appropriate to determine a possible violation of this rule upon the 
controlling constitutional interpretation at the time of the institution of 
disciplinary action rather than at the time of the rendition of services. 
Canon 3: A lawyer should assist in preventing the unauthorized prac-
tice of law. 
This Canon delineates the lawyer's responsibility to protect the public 
from unqualified individuals who do not possess the training in the law 
deemed necessary to a practitioner and who are not subject to the re-
quirements and regulations imposed upon members of the legal pro-
fession. The three Disciplinary Rules under Canon 3 specifically prohibit 
a lawyer from aiding in the unauthorized practice of law,23 dividing 
legal fees with a non-Iawyer,2-l or forming a partnership with a non-
lawyer.25 
Canon 4: A lawyer should preserve the confidences and secrets of a 
client. 
This traditional ethical standard encourages frank and open discussion 
between the client and his lawyer. The Disciplinary Rule defines the 
terms "confidence" and "secret" and enumerates the circumstances under 
which a lawyer mayor may not disclose a confidence or secret.26 
Canon 5: A lawyer should exercise independent professional judgment 
on behalf of a client. 
A lawyer's paramount duty is to represent his client with unswerving 
loyalty. Canon 5 proscribes any conduct or commitment by the lawyer 
that could compromise his performance of that duty, and the Disciplinary 
Rules under it postulate standards of professional conduct to the same 
end. A lawyer may not accept employment when his personal or business 
20 DR 2-107(A)(2). 
21 DR 2-103(D). 
22 DR 2-103(D) (5). 
23 DR 3-101. 
24 DR 3-102. 
25 DR 3-103. 
26 DR 4-101. 
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interests impair his independent judgment27 or when he knows or should 
know that he will be a witness in the case.28 A lawyer must withdraw 
from or refuse employment when the interests of another client are likely 
to be adverse.29 Other Disciplinary Rules under Canon 5 specify that a 
lawyer should avoid acquiring a proprietary interest in litigation30 and 
avoid the influences of third parties.31 
Canon 6: A lawyer should represent a client competently. 
This Canon is corollary to Canon 1. The rules forbid the handling of 
a legal matter which the lawyer is not competent to handle,32 inadequate 
preparation in the circumstances of a particular case,33 and neglect by a 
lawyer of a legal matter entrusted to him.34 They also prohibit a lawyer 
from limiting his liability to a client for his personal malpractice.35 
Canon 7: A lawyer should represent a client zealously within the 
bounds of the law. 
Canon 7 focuses on the heart of the adversary process and expresses 
succinctly the professional responsibility of a lawyer in the course of 
representing his client. The Disciplinary Rules set forth with specificity 
the standard of zealous representation to which the lawyer is required 
to conform36 and the bounds of the law within which a lawyer in the 
course of representation must remain.37 Among limitations related to the 
latter category, a lawyer is prohibited generally from communicating with 
a party of adverse interest38 or threatening to present criminal charges 
solely to obtain an advantage in a civil case.39 Other rules under Canon 
7 prescribe mandatory standards on trial conduct,40 trial publicity,41 com-
munications with jurors,42 and contact with witnesses,43 judges and 
officials.44 
Canon 8: A lawyer should assist in improving the legal system. 
The limited scope of the Disciplinary Rules together with the broad 
language espoused in this Canon suggests that it was intended to be an 
aspirational pronouncement of professional responsibility to which ethi-
27 DR 5-101(A). 
28 DR 5-101(B). 
29 DR 5-105. 
30 DR 5-103. 
31 DR 5-107. 
32 DR 6-101(A)(I). 
33 DR 6-101 (A) (2). 
34 DR 6-101 (A) (3). 
35 DR 6-102. 
36 DR 7-101. 
37 DR 7-102. 
38 DR 7-104. 
39 DR 7-105. 
40 DR 7-106. 
41 DR 7-107. 
42 DR 7-108. 
43 DR 7-109. 
44 DR 7-110. 
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cally responsive lawyers should strive. The specific prohibitions cover 
the use of a public office by a lawyer-occupant to obtain special advantage 
for himself or his client,45 and the making of statements or accusations 
known to be false against a judge or candidate for judicial appointment.46 
Canon 9: A lawyer should avoid even the appearance of p'rofessional 
impropriety. 
Canon 9 is designed to promote public confidence in the integrity of 
the legal system and legal profession. The Disciplinary Rules prohibit 
a lawyer from accepting private employment in a matter upon which 
he has acted in a former judicial47 or public48 position, and require a 
lawyer to preserve with utmost care the identity of funds and property 
of a client, including the maintenance of complete records regarding such 
funds or property.49 
§24.4. Disciplinary enforcement. Although the Canons and the 
Ethical Considerations will provide enlightened guidance to those mem-
bers of the bar who recognize that their professional responsibility is 
above mere conformance to the Disciplinary Rules, the fundamental 
utility of the new rule is directed at breach rather than observance. 
Nevertheless, neither the ABA Code nor Rule 3:22 delineates grievance 
procedures or penalties for violations.1 Enforcement of violations remains 
the responsibility of existing grievance committees. Twelve county bar 
associations, the Boston Bar Association and Massachusetts Bar Associa-
tion have appointed such comInittees to receive allegations of violations 
of disciplinary rules, conduct hearings and recommend to their governing 
boards whether the filing of information proceedings with the Supreme 
Judicial Court is warranted. However, as recent national2 and 10caP re-
ports have shown, serious inadequacies exist in current programs of dis-
ciplinary enforcement in all parts of the country. In Massachusetts, 
professional dtscipline is marked by "a conspicuous absence of uniformity 
in grievance procedures .... [I]t can be said that the only common ... 
feature [among grievance committees is] the unlimited discretion enjoyed 
by each grievance committee in determining what methods it will em-
ploy."4 It is safe to say that under present conditions, the new rule 
45 DR 8-101. 
46 DR 8-102. 
47 DR 9-101 (A). 
48 DR 9-101 (B). 
49 DR 9-102. 
§24.4. 1 Supreme Judicial Court Rule 3:01(6) provides that discipline by 
the Court may be by censure, suspension, or disbarment. However, none of these 
sanctions is made specifically applicable to specific disciplinary breaches. 
2 ABA Committee on Evaluation of Disciplinary Enforcement, Problems and 
Recommendations in Disciplinary Enforcement (1970). This celebrated report is 
popularly known as the "Clark Report" after its Chairman, Retired Justice Tom 
C. Cl'ark of the United States Supreme Court. 
3 Inker & White, The "Clark Report" in Massachusetts, 56 Mass. L.Q. 141 
(1971). 
4 Id. at 142. 
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cannot be implemented in the manner necessary to provide effective, 
equitable and uniform self-regulation to the legal profession. 
The solution to the problem may lie in an action being carried forward 
by the Supreme Judicial Court. Acting upon a petition filed by the 
Massachusetts Bar Association, the Court has been exploring the possi-
bility of unification of the Massachusetts bar by judicial order. It has 
entered an interlocutory order setting forth seven objectives, including 
professional ethics and disciplinary enforcement, clients' security, and uni-
form procedures for investigation and disposition of grievances.5 A special 
master, Retired Justice of the Court R. Ammi Cutter, has been appointed 
to conduct hearings and file reports pursuant to the objectives set forth 
in the order. The Court has reserved its judgment on the extent to 
which it will effect unification of the bar in the Commonwealth. Many 
aspects of the plan no doubt require examination and careful delibera-
tion. But clearly, the promulgation of comprehensive rules for a program 
of disciplinary enforcement in Massachusetts will go far towards allevi-
ating the present deficiencies and realizing the proper implementation 
of the new Code. It is encouraging to see the Supreme Judicial Court's 
enthusiastic pursuit af reforms in this heretofore neglected area. 
B. JUDICIAL CONDUCT 
§24.5. Introduction. The Code of Judicial Conduct was adopted by 
the House of Delegates of the American Bar Association on August 16, 
1972, replacing the old ABA Canons of Judicial Ethics. The Supreme 
Judicial Court, acting with admirable dispatch, announced nine days 
later that it was considering the Code for adoption in Massachusetts. 
It received the opinions and suggestions of interested parties in the 
matter, notably a brief filed by the Massachusetts Bar Association, and 
on December 4, 1972, it promulgated a slightly revised version of the 
Code as Chapter Five of its court rules.! The Code is effective in Massa-
chusetts regarding conduct occurring after January 1, 1973. 
The Code consists of seven Canons which express in general terms 
the standards of professional conduct that judges should abserve. Ac-
companying each Canon is a text which sets forth specific rules derived 
from it. The Canons and text are mandatory in character unless other-
wise indicated. They state the level of professional conduct below which 
a judge is subject to disciplinary action. These sections have been adopted 
by the Supreme Judicial Court in revised form. The Court did not adopt 
5 Interlocutory Order on Petition to Organize the Bar of Massachusetts as a 
Unified Self-governing Bar by Rule of Court, Supreme Judicial Court, Supreme 
Judicial Court, Full Court No. 7718 (November 30, 1972). 
§24.S. 1 At this writing, in addition to Massachusetts, Colorado and West Vir-
ginia have adopted versions of the Code. Other states are giving it consideration. 
A special committee of the ABA is currently working to realize its adoption in all 
the states. 
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as part of its rule the commentaries that follow various specific rules in 
the ABA Code. The commentaries are explanatory statements of the 
objectives and rationales of certain Canons and specific rules. The com-
mentaries remain, however, a reference source of the drafter's intent 
and objectives for use in the interpretation of the Canons and rules. 
§24.6. The Canons and related Rules. The newly stated Canons pro-
vide a broad conceptual framework for the accompanying text of speci-
fic rules. The seven Canons as adopted by the Supreme Judicial Court 
are as follows: 
Canon 1: A judge should uphold the integrity and independence 
of the judiciary. 
Canon 2: A judge should avoid impropriety and the appearance 
of impropriety in all his activities. 
Canon 3: A judge should perform the duties of his office impartially 
and diligently. 
Canon 4: A judge may engage in activities to improve the law, 
the legal system, and the administration of justice. 
Canon 5: A judge should regulate his extra-judicial activities to 
minimize the risk of conflict with his judicial duties. 
Canon 6: A judge should regularly file reports of compensation 
received for quasi-judicial and extra-judicial activities. 
Canon 7: A judge should refrain from political activity inappropri-
ate to his judicial office.l 
The text accompanying Canon 1 of the ABA Code was expanded to 
state that the provisions of the Code do not place "any limitation upon 
the Supreme Judicial Court in the exercise of its power of general super-
intendence whether statutory or inherent, in areas not delineated in the 
Code." Thus, the Court preserves by specific reservation its broad super-
visory power over the judicial system, including the power to discipline 
a member of the judiciary for misconduct in areas not specifically covered 
in the Code.2 
Several Rules under Canon 3 have been adopted with changes from 
the ABA Code. The provision under Canon 3 in the ABA Code that a 
judge may obtain the advice of a disinterested expert on the law under 
certain prescribed conditions has been dropped. The rule that a judge 
may permit the recording and reproduction of judicial proceedings was 
adapted to conform to existing or future rules of Court and broadened 
to extend to use for educational purposes.3 The rule directing a judge to 
initiate disciplinary action against a judge or lawyer for unprofessional 
conduct was amended to require in addition that a judge who has be-
§24.6. 1 This Canon differs slightly from Canon 7 of the ABA Code: "A 
judge should refrain from political activity." 
2 See §24.9, infr.a. 
3 Canon 3A (7). All citations to the text of the Code of Judicial Ethics are 
to the version adopted by the Supreme Judicial Court. 
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come aware of such conduct by another judge to report his knowledge 
to the Chief Justices of the Supreme Judicial Court and of the court of 
which the judge in question is a member.4- One section of Canon 3 re-
quires a judge to disqualify himself in any proceeding in which he has 
a financial interest.5 The definition of "financial interest" for the purposes 
of this section has been narrowed to ownership of a substantial legal or 
equitable interest,6 whereas the ABA version included any degree of 
ownership, however small. A related subsection of the definition further 
differs from the ABA Code by adding that ownership of a small percentage 
of shares of a corporation is a financial interest only if the outcome of 
proceeding could substantially affect the value of the interest.7 Though 
these changes give judges more latitude in financial matters than would 
the ABA Code, the Massachusetts version did adopt the more stringent 
of alternative provisions regarding operation of a business, so that judges 
are prohibited from such activity completely.8 Finally, complementing the 
many provisions regulating the personal business affairs of judges, a 
judge must file a public report yearly in the office of the Executive 
Secretary of the Supreme Judicial Court setting forth the date, place and 
nature of any activity for which a judge received compensation; the name 
of the payor; and the amount of compensation received during the 
previous calendar year.9 
The Massachusetts Code also deleted various provisions that have no 
application in the Commonwealth, such as references to judicial elections, 
or pro tempore judgeships. 
§24.7. Code Enforcement. If the Code is to restore and elevate 
public confidence in the integrity and competence of the judiciary, it 
must be scrupulously observed. Ensuring such observance will require 
the establishment of clearly drawn and effective disciplinary procedures. 
The two DeSaulnier opinions l and their aftermath have brought into 
sharp focus the inadequacy of the procedures which are presently avail-
able for these purposes. A judge may only be removed from judicial 
office for misconduct, not by the Supreme Judicial Court, but by legis-
lative and executive branches pursuant to express constitutional author-
ity.2 Judicial discipline short of removal rrom office rests with the 
judiciary. But because of the lack of structured procedures in this area, 
cases which arise must necessarily be decided on an ad hoc basis. This 
was painfully evident in the DeSaulnier cases, a series of extraordinary 
proceedings in which the Supreme Judicial Court effected a result tanta-
4- Canon 3B(3). 
5 Canon 3C ( 1 ) (c). 
6 Canon 3C(3) (c). 
7 Canon 3C(3) (c) (iv). 
8 Canon 5C (2) . 
9 Canon 6C. 
§24.7. 1 In re DeSaulnier, 1971 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1345, 274 N.E.2d 454; In 
re DeSaulnier, 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. 65, 279 N.E.2d 296. 
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mount to removal by a very broad construction of its general superin-
tendence power over lower courts and its power to establish and enforce 
rules of court for the orderly conduct of judges and officers, and judicial 
administration.3 The Court held that these powers derived from common 
and constitutional law and that they impose on the Court a duty to 
prevent a judge found guilty of serious judicial misconduct from exer-
cising the power and duty of his office. The entire proceedings were, 
however, attended by considerable straining, much of which can be 
attributed to a lack of established remedial procedures. The Court's 
ruling that it could discipline a judge for misconduct in his capacity as 
a member of the bar suggests the extent to which it was groping for 
remedies. 
Existing procedures for judicial discipline on lesser matters are similarly 
inadequate and complex. Pursuant to Rule 3: 17 of the General Rules 
of the Supreme Judicial Court, complaints may be submitted to the 
Court's Committee on Complaints Concerning the Administration of 
Justice. They are preliminarily examined by the Executive Secretary of 
the Supreme Judicial Court, who is also secretary of the Committee on 
Complaints. Although the Executive Secretary's office can effectively 
handle some complaints, complex inquiries which need substantial pre-
liminary investigative preparation are beyond the capabilities of that 
office. The office is presently understaffed, and while time expended pur-
suant to judicial discipline could be more efficiently allocated in other 
matters affecting the administration of justice, matters of judicial dis-
cipline themselves would be more efficiently assigned to a body specially 
designed to handle them. 
An alternative to existing procedures has been proposed and legisla-
tion filed with the general court to establish a Judicial Qualification 
Commission to investigate complaints against any judge in the Common-
wealth.4 The proposed Commission would have the power to hold hear-
ings, subpoena witnesses and compel testimony. The plan has been 
modeled after one presently operative in California. The Board of Dele-
gates of the Massachusetts Bar Association has voted to support the 
establishment of such a commission. The enactment of legislation that 
would streamline existing procedure for judicial discipline, together 
with the new Code of Judicial Conduct, would be a great step toward 
ensuring public confidence in the integrity of judges in the Common-
wealth. 
STUDENT COMMENT 
§24.8. Constitutional processes for the discipline of judges in 
2 For a thorough treatment of this subject see §24.8, infra. 
3 The problems raised by these cases and their ramifications are analyzed in 
§24.9, infra. 
4 House Bill 1375 (1973). Other similar proposal's have been filed. See §24.9 
note 100, infra. 
10
Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law, Vol. 1972 [1972], Art. 27
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/asml/vol1972/iss1/27
680 1972 ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETTS LAW §24.8 
Massachusetts. The Massachusetts Constitution provides that all judi-
cial officers "shall hold their offices during good behavior .... "1 Apart 
from the "misconduct and mal-administration" standard found in the 
article on impeachment,2 the constitution neither defines "good behavior" 
nor suggests the sort of conduct which would violate this standard. Never-
theless, it does provide four ways in which a judge may be removed or 
retired: ( 1) by impeachment in the legislature;3 (2) by the governor 
and council upon address of the legislature;4- (3) by the governor and 
council for advanced age or disability;5 and (4) by mandatory retire-
ment upon reaching the age of seventy.6 The constitution places no 
responsibility for the removal of judges in any judicial court, and aside 
from removal and retirement by these four means, it makes no other 
provision for judicial discipline in cases in which a judge's conduct, while 
not in violation of the "good behavior" standard, is sufficiently offensive 
to require some sort of disciplinary action. 
This comment will examine, in their historical perspective, the nature 
of these constitutional processes for the removal of judges. It will analyze 
the adequacies of these techniques today, with special regard to those 
cases which might require some form of judicial discipline that is less 
extreme than removal. Finally, it will consider, in terms of efficiency, 
economy, and justice, the mechanisms and merits of alternative constitu-
tional processes for the discipline and removal of judges. 
I. BACKGROUND 
Impeachment. As noted above, judges in Massachusetts hold office 
"during good behavior" although they must retire at age seventy. They 
may, however, be removed by impeachment for "misconduct and mal-
administration in their offices." John Adams, the principal draftsman of 
the Massachusetts Constitution, was instrumental in the use therein of 
the "good ,behavior" and "misconduct and mal-administration" standards. 
His insistence that a judge's term continue "during good behavior" pro-
bably was a response to the fact that, prior to the Declaration of In-
dependence, the commissions of the judges of Massachusetts, unlike the 
commissions of their English counterparts, did not contain the clause 
quamdiu se bene gesserint (for so long as they conduct themselves well).7 
§24.8. 1 Mass. Const. pt. 2, c. 3, art. I. 
2 Mass. Const. pt. 2, c. 1, §2, art. VIII. 
3 Id. 
4- Mass. Const. pt. 2, c. 3, art. I. 
5 Id. 
6 Id. 
7 3 J. ADAMS, WORKS 558, 559 (C. F. Adams ed. 1850). "'Good behavior' is 
commonly associated with the Act of Settlement [12 & 13 Will. 3, c. 2, §37 
(1700)] which granted judges tenure quamdiu se bene gesserint, that is, for so 
long as they conduct themselves well, and provided for terminatiO'Il by the Crown 
upon Address (formal request) of both Houses of Parliament. The origin of 
'good behavior,' however, long antidates the Act." Berger, Impeachment of Judges 
11
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As a result, the tenure of the colonial judges was not as secure against 
arbitrary tennination by the Crown as was the tenure of the English 
judges. Adams' insistence on the use of the "misconduct and mal-
administration" standard for removal by impeachment probably was 
based on his unsuccessful attempt, in 1774, to have Chief Justice Oliver 
removed by impeachment for accepting his salary from George III rather 
than from the Massachusetts legislature. Governor Hutchinson refused 
to try the Chief Justice "on the ground that he knew of no 'high crimes 
and misdemeanors' chargeable against the Chief Justice of which the 
Governor and Council had jurisdiction."8 Although the Chief Justice 
was effectively removed from office in 1775 by the Declaration of In-
dependence, Adams did not forget the problems which he had encountered 
in the Oliver case. His choice of "misconduct and mal-administration" 
rather than "high crimes and misdemeanors" as the standard for im-
peachment arguably was intended to broaden the definition of judicial 
misconduct punishable by removal from office by impeachment.9 
What is the nature of an impeachment?10 Impeachment trials in 
England were criminal in nature and the House of Lords could inflict 
capital or any other punishment on a person who was impeached and 
convicted.ll The tenninology employed in the Massachusetts Constitu-
tion with regard to impeachment may be considered contradictory, or at 
least inconsistent, on this point. In one provision it refers to impeach-
ment in apparently criminal terms: "The power of pardoning offenses, 
except such as persons may be convicted of before the senate by an im-
peachment of the house, shall be in the governor .... "12 Yet a distinc-
tion between a criminal trial and an impeachment proceeding might be 
inferred from the provision of the constitution which states that the 
judgment of the senate in an impeachment trial 
and 'Good Behavior' Tenure, 79 Yale L.J. 1475, 1478 (1970) [Hereinafter cited 
as Berger]. 
8 Causes of Impeachment and Legislative Practice, 13 Mass. L.Q. 37, 42 (#5, 
1928) [hereinafter cited as 13 Mass. L.Q.]. The traditional English categories of 
"high crimes and misdemeanors" which were cause for impeachment were, inter 
alia, misapplication of funds, abuse of official power, neglect of duty, encroach-
ment on Parliament's prerogatives, corruption, and advice of pernicious measures. 
Berger, Impeachment for 'High Crimes and Misdemeanors," 44 S. Cal. L. Rev. 
395,411-413 (1971). 
9 13 Mass. L.Q., note 8, supra, at 42. It has been said that conduct of either 
description (misconduct or maladministration) is a ground for impeachment, but 
it must occur in the office of the officer to be removed. Opinion of the Justices, 
308 Mass. 619, 626-27, 33 N.E.2d 275, 279 (1941) [hereinafter cited as Opinion 
of the Justices]. 
10 Raoul Berger has directed himself to this question, especially in the federal 
context, in his very comprehensive and authoritative book, IMPEACHMENT: THE 
CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES (1973). 
II Trial of Prescott, 193. 
12 Mass. Const. pt. 2, c. 2, §l, art. VIII. 
12
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shall not extend further than to removal from office and disqualifica-
tion to hold or enjoy any place of honor, trust, or profit, under this 
commonwealth: but the party so convicted, shall be, nevertheless, 
liable to indictment, trial, judgment, and punishment, according to 
the laws of the land.13 
Then again, the constitution employs criminal terminology when it says 
that, "[t]he house of representatives shall be the grand inquest of this 
commonwealth; and all impeachments made by them, shall be heard 
and tried by the senate." (Emphasis added) .14 Yet the provision of the 
constitution separating "removal from office" by impeachment from sub-
sequent criminal prosecution seems to indicate that impeachment is not 
criminal in nature. Construing impeachment as a criminal proceeding 
might raise questions of double jeopardy.15 Also, if an impeachment were 
deemed criminal in nature, so as to amount to a "criminal case", it 
might possibly contradict the constitutional right of trial by jury in 
such cases.t6 
Massachusetts has had little experience with the impeachment of 
judges. Since the writing of the state's constitution in 1780, only one 
judge has been impeached by the house of representatives and tried and 
convicted by the senate. In 1821, Middlesex Probate Court Judge James 
Prescott was convicted for extortion in the collection of fees in excess 
of amounts authorized by statute and removed from office.1' His case 
was tried by some of the most distinguished and able lawyers in the 
history of Massachusetts.18 
13 Mass. Const. pt. 2, c. 1, 12, art. VIII. 
14 Mass. Const. pt. 2, c. 1, 13, art. VI. "The term 'grand inquest' is not 
unknown, and has, so far as we are advised, no other meaning than 'grand jury.''' 
Geiger v. United States, 162 F. 844, 845 (1908). 
15 Indeed, in response to the proposed constitution of 1780, the townspeople of 
Sutton, Massachusetts, objected to the impeachment article on just such grounds, 
since the impeached official could be subsequently tried in a court of law. O. 
HANDLIN AND M. HANDLIN, THE POPULAR SOURCES OF POLITICAL AUTHORITY: 
DOCUMENTS ON THE MASSACHUSETTS CONSTITUTION OF 1780,235-36 (1966). 
16 U.S. Const. art. III, §2(3) and 6th Amendment; Mass. Const. pt. 1, arts 
XII & XV. 
17 A full report of the case of Judge Prescott was printed after the trial was 
over. An unofficial document compiled for, and published by, the Boston Daily 
Advertiser, it is hereinafter referred to as Trial of Prescott. As of the date of this 
writing, all four copies of the Trial of Prescott previously held at the State House 
Library were missing. Only one copy was found in existence in Boston, at the 
Social Law Library. 
18 In the trial before the senate, the managers on the part of the house were 
John G. King, Levi Lincoln, William Baylies, Warren Dutton, Samuel P.P. Fay, 
Lemuel Shaw (later Chief Justice of the Supreme Judicial Court), Sherman 
Leland, Horatio G. Newcomb and Francis C. Gray, the leading part being taken 
by Messrs. Shaw and Dutton. The counsel for Judge Prescott were William Pres-
cott, George Blake, Daniel Webster, Samuel Hoar, Samuel Hubbard (later a 
Justice of the Supreme Judicial Court), and Augustus Peabody, the leading part 
being taken by Messrs. Hoar, Blake and Webster. Trial of Prescott, 11, 15, 211. 
13
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The fifteen articles of impeachment against Judge Prescott could be 
conveniently arranged in three classes: 
1. Demanding and receiving other and greater fees for performing 
the duties of his office, than are by law allowed. 
2. Transacting the business of the Probate Court at his own private 
office, and not at any Probate Court held according to law. . . . 
3. Acting as counsel, and demanding and receiving fees for advice 
and assistance in matters upon which he had passed, or might be 
called to pass, or which were pending before him as a judge.19 
Such alleged acts formed the basis of the house's claims of "misconduct 
and mal-administration in office" by Judge Prescott. Custom and usage 
were the principal defenses relied on by Prescott.20 Ultimately, he was 
acquitted on all but two of the fifteen articles. On those two articles, the 
third and the twelfth, he was found "guilty by a majority of the members 
present and voting thereon."21 
The trial of Prescott stands unique in the constitutional and judicial 
history of Massachusetts. The participants in the trial were aware of its 
historical significance. 22 Yet, it has limited value as precedent in deter-
mining the exact nature of impeachment. During the proceedings, Lemuel 
Shaw (for the house) and Daniel Webster (for the respondent) both 
argued that impeachment was essentially a criminal proceeding.23 How-
19 Trial of Prescott, 27. 
20 Id. at 18, 28. 
21 Id. at 207. The total amount for which Prescott was impeached was about 
forty-six dollars collected over a period of fifteen years. Id. at 128. 
22 As Mr. King, the Chairman of the Managers, said in opening the prosecu-
tion: " ... they [the managers] cannot but feel embarrassed and oppressed by the 
novelty and solemnity of this scene. This is the first instance of the trial of a 
Judge under our present constitution; the first instance, in which the people have 
appealed to their constitutional protectors against the ministers of justice. Every 
circumstance connected wih this trial partakes of this solemn character and deep 
interest. . • ." Id. at 26. 
23 "I do not advocate the proposition that this Hon. Court is bound by all the 
rules and forms of other inferior Courts, but I do contend that the Constitution 
is as imperative on this Court as on any other, where it declares, that every 
man's offense shall be described to him plainly, substantially and formally. This 
Court is a criminal Court; its judgment is as deep, as penal, as the judgment 
of any Court. It does not take away life, but it takes away every thing that 
makes life worth having. You take away not only a man's property, not his office 
merely; you disfranchise him, you dismember him, you turn him out of his 
society, you disqualify him, you take away the privilege which every citizen 
enjoys, of holding and being elected to office if the people see fit to choose him. 
You are a Court of criminal jurisdiction, and are bound substantially by the 
universal, fundamental rules of justice, by which all Court are governed." Id. at 
43 [Webster]. 
". . . [W] e have never for a moment imagined, that the proceedings on this 
impeachment could be influenced or offected [sic. affected] by that provision 
[the provision of the constitution for removal by address]. The two modes of 
proceeding are altogether distinct, and in my humble apprehension were designed 
14
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ever, the judgment of the senate was rendered without an opinion, and 
it appears to have been limited to removal from office without any ex-
plicit consideration of "disqualification" or other punishment.24 The 
assertion of counsel for both sides that the nature of the proceeding was 
essentially criminal were uncontradicted, but there was no affirmative de-
cision on that point. 
The Supreme Judicial Court has been apprised of this problem at 
least twice, but the results have been less than definitive. On one oc-
casion, in a discussion of the impeachment clause of the constitution, 
the following was argued to the court: 
It was stated by Mr. Lemuel Shaw, one of the managers in the trial 
of Judge Prescott, that the Senate in such a case sits as 'a court of 
justice, of criminal jurisdiction, possessing all the attributes and in-
cidents of such a court.' Prescott's case, 182. Jurisdiction therefore 
being given to the Senate, as a court, of the offense of judicial mis-
conduct, such jurisdiction must be exclusive, except so far as con-
current jurisdiction is given to some other tribunal. The Constitu-
tion states one express exception, namely, the right of the appropriate 
tribunal to proceed by indictment, but it states no other. This clause 
of the Constitution makes judicial misconduct a crime, and desig-
nates the Senate as the tribunal to try it. Being a crime, it falls 
within the 12th article of the Declaration of Rights, which declares 
that 'No subject shall be held to answer for any crimes or offense, 
until the same is fully and plainly, substantially and formally, de-
scribed to him.' It also gives him the right 'to meet the witnesses 
against him face to face, and to be fully heard in his defense by 
himself, or his counsel, at his election.' (Emphasis added.) 25 
to effect totally distinct objects. No Sir; had the House of Representatives expected 
to attain their object, by any means short of the allegation, proof and conviction 
of criminal misconduct, an address and not an impeachment would have been 
the course of proceeding adopted by them. We readily therefore agree, that 
there is no question of expediency, of fitness or unfitness; but one of judicial 
inquiry, of guilt or innocence .... We also cheerfully accede to the proposition 
that this is a court of justice, of criminal jurisdiction, possessing all the attributes 
and incidents of such a court." Id. at 182. [Shaw]. 
24 Id. at 209, 210. "The Court for the trial of impeachment having found 
James Prescott guilty of misconduct and maladministration in the office of Judge 
of Probate of wills and for granting letters of administration within and for the 
county of Middlesex, charged upon him in the third and twelfth article of im-
peachment as charged against him by the House of Representatives-It is con-
sidered by the Court, that the said James Prescott be removed from the office 
of Judge as aforesaid ... and he is removed accordingly." Id. at 209. 
25 Commonwealth v. Harriman, 134 Mass. 314,318-319 (1883). The language 
of the Prescott trial, quoted here in the argument in the Harriman case, charac-
terizes the senate in an impeachment trial as a "court." It should be noted that 
both sides in the Prescott trial were quite careful to characterize the senate in an 
impeachment trial as a "judicial court" and not a legislative body, or "legisla-
tive court." Trial of Prescott, 164, 182. 
15
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The Court, in its decision in that case, chose not to discuss the argument 
that the constitution makes judicial misconduct a crime. But the asser-
tion that it does is open to question. When the Court later addressed 
itself to the meaning of "misconduct and mal-administration in office," 
the result was an ambiguous opinion which was confusing in its attempt 
to define those words and which did little to aid in a precise determina-
tion of the nature of an impeachment proceeding. The Court said 
that 
[t]he two words 'misconduct' and 'mal-administration' convey dis-
tinct ideas to the mind though the same conduct may often fall 
within both words. They do not describe, however, two elements of 
a single wrongdoing. Conduct of either description [misconduct or 
maladministration] is a ground for impeachment .... [And] . 
'misconduct' that does not amount to 'mal-administration' may be 
a ground for impeachment.26 
In the same opinion the Court also said that: 
[t]he words 'misconduct and mal-administration in their offices,' 
used in art. 8, and the word 'misconduct' as used therein include 
acts or omissions of [an officeholder] while holding the office ... 
that can be said reasonably to render him unfit to continue to hold 
the office.27 
The Court thus infers two levels of misbehavior, with "misconduct" 
being less offensive than "mal-administration." Such acts or omissions 
do not have to be crimes, and thus,without being explicit, the opinion 
strongly suggested that something less than criminal conduct might be 
ground for impeachment. Any act or omission which would render the 
official "unfit to hold the office" is included in, but not a limitation on, 
categorization of impeachable offenses. Thus, the Court did not rule 
out the possibility of impeachment for conduct of a tortious nature or 
which is so contrary to the established notions of judicial administration28 
as to arouse the indignation of the general publric. 
A determination of the exact nature of an impeachment trial has im-
26 Opinion of the Justices, note 9, supra at 627, 33 N.E.2d at 279. In this 
case, the justices answered certain questions of the house of representatives in 
relation to the possible impeachment of a member of the executive council. 
27 Id. at 629, 33 N.E.2d at 280. It is submitted that the Court chose to use 
the words "while holding office" instead of "while in office" in order to clarify 
the broad category of acts for which an officer might be impeached. I.e., the acts 
or omissions are not limited to those which might occur while an officer is physi-
cally in his office, or while he, is wearing his robes, but rather they extend to 
any acts or omissions occurring during his term of office which might render him 
unfit to hold office. 
28 Such conduct might include habitual intemperence, habitual absence from 
office or neglect of duties, habitually crude treatment of parties and witnesses, 
etc. 
16
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portant bearing on several aspects of the trial procedure, such as the 
rules of pleadings and evidence, the burden of proof, the vote required 
to convict, the right to appeal, and the applicability of statutes of limita-
tions. The trial of Judge Prescott was, in many ways, too ambiguous to 
be of assistance in the determination of these issues. For example, at one 
point, Warren Dutton, for the prosecution, said: 
As to the rules of evidence which are to govern a Court of Im-
peachment, I agree with the learned Counsel who opened this part 
o[sic, of] the Respondent's defence, that they are essentially the same 
as govern Courts of Common Law .... 
I also agree with the same learned Gentleman, that the same legal 
notions of crimes and offenses, are as substantially to be regarded 
in this Court, as in any other.29 
Yet Mr. Dutton seemed to be contradicting what he had stated earlier 
in the trial: 
The words misconduct and mal-administration in office include 
every thing in the nature of an offense-bribery, extortion, as well 
as other ofJe,nses for which an indictment would not lie at common 
law; and the Respondent may be impeached and condemned for 
acts for which he could not be indicted. (Emphasis added.) 30 
In spite of the arguments that an impeachment trial is tantamount to 
a criminal proceeding,31 there is strong indication that it is not. If the 
framers of the constitution had contemplated that impeachment was to 
be a criminal proceeding, they would probably not have provided that, not-
withstanding impeachment, a person could still be called before a jury 
upon an indictment and be required to answer.32 If the proceedings are 
criminal, then it would seem to follow that the proof necessary to con-
vict must be beyond a reasonable doubt. The Massachusetts Constitution 
is silent on this point. In the Prescott trial, the question of the degree 
of proof necessary to convict was not explicitly discussed, but was raised 
indirectly by reference to the common law.33 It may be questioned 
29 Trial of Prescott, 193. 
30 Id. at 79. 
31 Although impeachment does not prevent indictment, and although the 
punishment is limited to removal and disqualification, impeachment proceedings 
are highly penal in their nature and governed by rules of law applicable to 
criminal causes, so that provisions of statutes and of constrtutions on the subject 
of procedure therein are to be construed strictly. 46 Corpus Juris 1002-1003, 
citing, inter alia, State v. Hasty, 184 Ala. 121, 63 S. 559 (1913), Nelson v. 
State, 182 Ala. 449, 62 S. 189 (1913), State v. Hastings, 37 Nebr. 96, 55 
N.W. 774 (1893). See also note 23, supra. 
32 2 PEOPLE v. SULZER, 1534 (1913). This argument was made by the prosecu-
tion in the impeachment trial of Governor Sulzer of New York in 1913. The 
impeachment clause of the New York constitution is virtually the same as that of 
Massachusetts with regard to judgment. 
33 See text at note 29, supra. 
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whether a conviction by a simple majority vote is the result of proof of 
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. On one of the two articles on which 
Prescott was convicted, the vote against him was less than two-thirds of 
the votes cast.34 One of the traditional assurances that the burden of 
proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt has been met in criminal jury 
trials has been the requirement of a unanimous vote for conviction by 
all twelve jurors. Anything less than an unequivocal vote would show 
that reasonable men do entertain doubts as to the guilt of the accused, 
and that the burden of proof required in a criminal proceeding has not 
been met.35 Perhaps it would be asking too much to require and expect 
a unanimous vote by forty senators in an impeachment trial, yet it is 
submitted that a simple majority vote for conviction fails to supply 
adequate assurance that such burden of proof has been met. If Massa-
chusetts had had a rule similar to that of New York, i.e., that a two-
thirds vote of those present is required to convict in an impeachment 
trial,36 Prescott would have been acquitted on at least one of those two 
articles on which he was ultimately convicted. Judge Prescott was repre-
sented by extremely able counsel, yet the question of the number of votes 
required to convict was not raised. 
It should be noted also that there is no provision for appeal and review 
in impeachment cases: 
The legislative power of impeachment is not an arbitrary power, 
but the authority is final, and the judgment of the senate sitting as 
a court of impeachment cannot be called in question in any tribunal 
whatsoever except for lack of jurisdiction or excess of constitutional 
power.38 
Consider then, the following hypothetical under the Massachusetts Con-
stitution: Assume an impeachment proceeding for alleged criminal acts, 
in which a judge is convicted. That judgment cannot be appealed nor, 
apparently, may the judge be pardoned.39 Then assume that the judge 
34 Trial of Prescott, 206 (third article, 16-9). 
35 It is conceded, however, that the strength of such an argument is diminished 
somewhat by the holding in Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972), which 
ruled that the sheth amendment, made applicable to the states by the fourteenth, 
does not require jury unanimity. Also, in the companion case of Johnson v. 
Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, (1972) the Court upheld a 9-3 criminal conviction 
(three-quarters vote of the jury) observing that CI ••• a substantial majority of 
the jury ... were convinced by the evidence .... [D]isagreement of [one-quarter 
of the] jurors does not alone establish a reasonable doubt, particularly when such 
a heavy majority of the jury, after having considered the dissenters' views, remains 
convinced of guilt." 406 U.S. 356, 362. 
36 N.Y. Const. art. 6, §24. 
37 See note 63, infra. 
38 46 Corpus Juris 1003, citing In re Opinion of Court, 14 Fla. 289 (1872); 
State v. O'DriscoII, 5 S.C.L. 526, 7 S.C.L. 713 (1815); Ferguson v. Maddox, 114 
Tex. 85, 263 S.W. 888 (1924). Mass Const. pt. 2, c. 2, § 1, art. VIII states that 
a conviction by impeachment may not be pardoned. 
39 See note 12, supra. 
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is indicted and convicted in a judicial criminal court for the same offenses. 
It would appear then that his case in the second proceeding may be 
appealed and reviewed, and that he may even be pardoned, or his con-
viction may be reversed. The anomaly becomes obvious. If his conviction 
in the second proceeding may be overturned, or if he may be pardoned 
for the offense, then a double standard is applied: one wrongful act is 
punishable in two different criminal courts with materially different re-
sults. One conviction is not reviewable and not pardonable, and the 
other is fully reviewable and pardonable. If a pardon or a reversal is 
granted on the second conviction, the first conviction still stands. Is 
the judge still a criminal? Consider also the confusion if the judge were 
acquitted in the second proceeding. 
Finally, if impeachment were truly a criminal proceeding as was 
argued in the Prescott trial, statutes of limitations might possibly be 
raised as a bar to impeachment. In the Prescott case, some of the offenses 
alleged occurred sixteen years before the trial.40 The general statute of 
limitation for the crimes which Prescott allegedly committed is and 
always has been six years.41 Yet, this issue was not raised on Prescott's 
behalf. 
Perhaps, in the end, we can only reach the ambiguous determination 
of the nature of impeachment that was argued in the trial of Governor 
Sulzer of New York in 1913: "It is a proceeding, a trial if you will, 
that stands in a class by itself. It is neither exclusively criminal upon 
the one side nor exclusively civil upon the other."42 Perhaps it is because 
of this ambiguity in its nature that impeachment has been used only 
once in Massachusetts to remove a judge. Its rareness might also be the 
result of the existence of the much easier method of removal by address. 
Address. In addition to impeachment, the Massachusetts Constitution 
provides that "[t]he governor, with the consent of the council, may re-
move ... [judicial officers] upon the address of both houses of the legis-
lature."43 The address procedure stems from the English Act of Settlement 
( 1700) 44 which provided for judicial tenure during good behavior 
(formerly the judges' 'commissions had been held during the king's pleas-
ure) , and which, in an effort to reduce the king's prerogative, provided 
that, notwithstanding the commission during good behavior, judges 
could lawfully be removed by the Crown only upon an address of both 
Houses of Parliament. Removal by address" 'is, in fact, a qualification of, 
or exception from, the words creating a tenure during good behavior, 
and not an incident or legal consequence thereof'; the power 'may be 
40 Trial of Prescott, 8. 
41 G.L., c. 277, §63. 
42 2 PEOPLE V. SULZER, 1533-1534. In Nebraska, impeachment proceedings 
are considered criminal in nature. State v. Leese, 37 Nebr. 92, 94, 55 N.W. 798, 
799 (1893). 
43 Mass. Canst. pt. 2, c. 3, art. I. 
44 Berger, note 7, supra at 1500 n.127. 
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invoked upon occasions when the misbehavior complained of would not 
constitute a legal breach of the conditions on which the office is held.' "45 
Perhaps because most of the United States may have recognized the 
availability of the address procedure as a means for arbitrary invasion 
of the independence of the judiciary, only four states-Maryland, Massa-
chusetts, New Hampshire, and South Carolina-in drafting their con-
stitutions provided for the removal of judges by address without regard 
to misbehavior.46 The result in Massachusetts has been that a judge 
may be removed without any reason being demonstrated, and without 
a hearing, if a simple majority of the members of both houses of the 
legislature 'and the governor's council can gain the concurrence of the 
governor.47 
The power of removal of judges by address has been exercised in 
Massachusetts on a number of occasions, as compared to the single 
instance of removal by impeachment discussed above. Two judges of 
the court of common pleas were removed by address in 1803 for ex-
tortion,48 two justices of the peace were removed by address in 1876,49 
and on at least three occasions the procedure was used in cases relating 
to judges of the higher courts: 
In 1803 Mr. Justice Bradbury of the Supreme Judicial Court was 
45 1 A. TODD, PARLIAMENTARY GOVERNMENT (Walpole ed. 1892), quoted in 
Berger, note 7, supra at 1500 n.127. Merger notes that the Act of Settlement "was 
designed to curb royal interference with judges, not to restrict Parliament" and 
also that it did not provide Parliament with a means of forcing the Crown to 
follow its request for the removal of a judge. Berger, note 7, supra at 1500-01. 
The Act of Settlement made removal by address the only means by which the 
Crown could remove judges. It did not impinge upon the right to Parliament to 
impeach and try judges. 
46 Section 30 of the Maryland Constitution (1766), provided: "Judges shall 
be removed for misbehavior on conviction in a court of law, and may be removed 
by the Govemor, upon the address of the General Assembly. . . ." 1 B. POORE, 
FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, COLONIAL CHARTERS (1877) 819. The 
Massachusetts Constitution of 1780, c. 3, art. 1, read as it does today, "All judicial 
officers .•. shall hold their offices during good behavior . . . provided, neverthe-
less, the govemor . . . may remove them upon the address of both houses of the 
legislature." Id. at 968. The New Hampshire constitution (1784) read the same 
as that of Massachusetts on removal by address. 2 Id. at 1290. Section XX of the 
South Carolina Constitution (1776) read that judges were to be commissioned 
"during good behavior, but shall be removed on the address of the general assembly 
and legislative counci1." 2 Id. at 1619. 
47 See generally, Frothingham, The Removal of Judges by Legislative Address 
in Massachusetts, 8 Am. Po1. Sci. Rev. 216 (1914) [hereinafter cited as Frothing-
ham]. See also, Grinnell, the Removal of Judge Bradbury in 1803 and the History 
of the Removal by Address in Massachusetts, 2 Mass. L.Q. 508 (1917) [herein-
after cited as Grinnell]. 
48 Frothingham, note 47, supra at 218-19. 
49 Id. at 219. The procedure for the removal of justices of the peace was 
changed in 1907 by Mass. Corm. Amend. art. XXXVII, which provides that 
"[t]he governor, with the consent of the council, may remove justices of the peace 
and notaries public. 
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removed because of incurable illness, his reason for not resigning 
being that he had no means of support. He died so soon after his 
removal that the problem of support did not continue. During the 
period of anti-slavery excitement, Judge Charles [sic., Edward] G. 
Loring, who was both Judge of Probate in Suffolk County and 
United States Commissioner, was removed by Governor Banks 
[March 19, 1858] upon address of the legislature from his office of 
Judge of Probate because, in his capacity as United States Commis-
sioner, he enforced the fugitive slave law, which was at that time 
unpopular in this neighborhood. This was an obvious abuse of the 
process as his act as commissioner was a simple performance of his 
duty under the law. The legislature had voted an address in the 
previous year and Governor Gardiner had refused to make the re-
moval. The next case was that of the removal of Judge Day of the 
Barnstable Probate Court ... in 1882."50 
Judge Joseph M. Day'S removal brings into focus the contrasting uses 
of address and impeachment in Massachusetts history. By 1882, address, 
in spite of its arbitrary and unlimited nature, seems to have replaced 
impeachment as the means for removing judges, even for blatant offenses 
which would normally be impeachable. The acts of misconduct which 
were attributed to Judge Day, and for which he was never tried, were 
at least as criminal as the acts for which Judge Prescott was impeached 
in 1821.51 Yet no reasons for his removal were stated in the address to 
the governor, and none were assigned by the governor in his removaJ.52 
Judge Day protested his removal by address, especially since it denied 
him the right to cross-examine witnesses against him, and, in a quo 
warranto proceeding against the judge appointed in his place; he sought 
a: judicial determination of the propriety of the procedure. The resulting 
case of Commonwealth v. Harriman53 required a thorough judicial 
determination of the nature and purpose of removal by address. Accord-
50 Grinnell, Removal by Address in Massachusetts and the Action of the 
Legislature on the Petition for the Removal of Mr. Justice Pierce, 7 Mass. L.Q. 
17, 19 (#4, 1922). 
51 Charges of misbehavior against Judge Day included, inter alia, allegations 
"that he improperly and illegally acted as counsel for executors, administrators, 
and guardians appointed by his own court • . .," that he allowed "the register 
of probate to take illegal fees ... ," that he was often in a state of "drunkenness" 
and was guilty of "rudeness," and that he was guilty of extortion (the alleged 
acts of which had taken place twenty-one years earlier). Hearing of Joseph M. 
Day, Senate 150, Report of the Joint Special Committee, xxv-xxviii (1882). 
52 The address reads simply: "To his Excellency John D. Long, Governor of 
the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. The two branches of the Legislature, in 
General Court assembled, respectfully request that your Excellency would be 
pleased, with the consent of the Council, to remove Joseph M. Day from the 
office of judge of probate and insolvency for the county of Barnstable." Id. at 
xxii. 
53 134 Mass. 314 (1883). 
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ing to Chief Justice Morton, who wrote the opinion of the Court, the 
common law does not control in the removal of judges by address. In 
such cases, no reason need be alleged. Judges may be removed notwith-
standing good behavior. "The Constitution authorizes the removal [by 
the address procedure] without any reason being assigned for it; and 
therefore it is wholly immaterial what evidence or causes induced the 
Legislature to vote the address, or led the Governor and Council to act 
upon it .... "54 On the question of the removal of judicial officers, the 
executive and the legislative department are the sole judges.55 The 
power of removal by address is unrestricted and without limitation.56 
The framers of the federal constitution rejected the procedure of 
removal of judges by address as "fundamentally wrong" and "arbitrary" 
since it provided for removal "without a trial."57 Address was also op-
posed "as weakening too much the independence of the Judges."58 In 
their efforts to assure that independence, the framers of the federal 
constitution restricted legislative interference with the judiciary "to 
trial by impeachment, under a standard ('high crimes and misdemeanors') 
of narrow, technical meaning, and even then a two-thirds vote was re-
quired for conviction."59 
There can be little question that the distrust of the arbitrary nature 
of the address procedure which was expressed by the framers of the 
federal constitution had a rational basis. The address procedure, as un-
limited and unrestricted 'as it is, cames with it always the threat of 
arbitrary interference in the judicial branch of government by the legis-
lative and executive branches. This danger of arbitrary interference is 
not unreal, as is well illustrated by the removal of Judge Loring: 
In the case of Judge Edward G. Loring, who was one of the dis-
tinguished lawyers of his day, it should be remembered that he was 
United States commissioner before he was appointed Judge of Pro-
bate, that there was no provision at that time against the holding 
of these two offices, and that the real cause of his removal was the 
fact that he did his duty as United States commissioner in enforcing 
the fugitive slave law as it then existed, but, as the law was un-
popular, this created the excitement which resulted in his removal 
from the probate lbench. In this instance, at least, it seems to be 
clear that the procedure was resorted to as a result of popular 
excitement not in any way connected with his conduct of the office 
from which he was removed, and that the community lost an 
54 rd. at 329. 
55 rd. at 326. 
56 rd. at 328. 
57 2 M. FARRAND, RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION 428 (revised ed. 
1937) . 
58 rd. at 429. 
59 Berger, note 7, supra at 1502. 
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efficient judge by the removal, which was merely for the purpose 
of punishing an unpopular act.60 
Retention of the address procedure has been rationalized on the theory 
that it "has undoubtedly had an influence in avoiding any serious agita-
tion for the recall of judges in Massachusetts."61 While there is no historic 
basis for this theory, it is true that Massachusetts has resisted the tempta-
tion to make judges subject to recall,62 thus protecting the independence 
of the judiciary. It is submitted, however, that to justify the retention of 
the address procedure, with its potential for arbitrary interference with 
the judiciary, simply on the basis that it might offset any demand for 
another potentially arbitrary removal procedure, is to give removal by 
address undeserved support. No provision of Massachusetts law dealing 
with the judiciary carries with it as much potential for interference with 
the independence of the judicial branch of the government as does the 
law relating to the removal of judges by address. That potential exists 
even though the address must be acted upon by four distinct entities-the 
house, the senate, the council, and the governor. 
The Massachusetts Constitutional Convention of 1820 twice considered 
the procedure for the removal of judges by address. The question first 
arose in a proposal to amend the constitution so as to require a two-
thirds vote of both houses of the legislature to remove judicial officers 
instead of a bare majority vote. The proposition was defeated at the 
convention by a vote of 210 to 105.63 It then arose a second time in a 
proposal that judicial officers should not 'be removed on address until 
the causes of removal were stated and such officers were given a chance 
to be heard in their own defense.54 This amendment was adopted by the 
convention,65 but it was rejected by the people at the polls.66 Although 
60 Grinnell, note 47, supra at 517. 
61 Id. 
62 Recall is a procedure for removal which exists in a smaH number of states. 
It originates with the electorate. If a specified percentage of voters sign a petition 
for recall, the judge must face a special election. In some states, the judge runs 
unopposed and must win a majority of the votes to stay in office. In other states, 
opposition candidates may run and the individual who receives the highest total 
of votes serves the remainder of the term. AMERICAN JUDICATURE SOCIETY, 
SELECTED READINGS ON THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICES AND ITs IMPROVE-
MENT 91 (1969). See also Note, Remedies for Judicial Misconduct and Disability: 
Removal and Discipline of Judges, 41 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 149, 164-65 (1966). 
63 See BOSTON DAILY ADVERTISER, JOURNAL OF DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS IN 
THE CONVENTION OF DELEGATES 472-86 (1853). Among the proponents of this 
measure were Lemuel Shaw and Daniel Webster, who were to meet one year 
later on opposite sides in the impeachment trial of Judge Prescott. Perhaps this 
is why Webster never raised the question of whether a two-thirds vote should be 
required to convict in an impeachment trial. See text at note 37, supra. 
54 BoSTON DAILY ADVERTISER, JOURNAL OF DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS IN THE 
CONVENTION OF DELEGATES 489 (1821). 
65 Id. at 489. 
66 Grinnell, note 47, supra at 515. 
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each of these proposals, if adopted, would have diminished the arbitrary 
nature of removal by address they would not have eliminated it. Techni-
cally, it would still be possible for a judge to be removed for no legally 
justifiable reason. The proposals might have improved the address pro-
cedure, but they still would not have provided absolute guarantees 
against its arbitrary use. In fact, despite the popular rejection of the 
recommendation of the Constitutional Convention of 1820, the practice 
in address cases has been to give such notice and opportunity for hearing 
as a matter of general custom.67 But notice and hearing do not amount 
to trial on the merits, and that was the basis of Judge Day's objection 
to his removal, as expressed in Commonwealth v. Harriman. Today, the 
procedure for the removal of judges by address is potentially as un-
limited and unrestricted as it was in 1780. 
Removal for Age and Disability. The Massachusetts Constitution of 
1780 provided for the removal of judges in only two ways: impeachment 
for "misconduct and mal-administration" in office, and removal by ad-
dress. Otherwise, the judicial commission was to be held "during good 
behavior", which amounted to life tenure. The sad case of Judge Brad-
bury, who was incapacitated to the point where he would never be able 
to work again, but who refused to resign because there was no provision 
for pensions at that time and because he had no other means of support, 
pointed up the need for a more benevolent method of involuntary re-
tirement for advanced age or disability. Bradbury was removed by ad-
dress in 1803.68 Over a hundred years later, following the Constitutional 
67 "In both these cases [Judge Loring and Judge Day] hearings were given, 
but only because this was a general custom. The course of procedure followed the 
usual method governing legislation. A petition was introduced for the removal 
of the judges. The petition was referred to a committee--in the Loring case to 
the committee on federal relations, and in the Day case to a special committee. 
These committees then sat and heard the evidence for and against removal, 
together with the arguments of counsel; after which in due time they reported 
to the legislature. This report, of course, had to be acted upon by both the 
house and the senate. If the committees favored removal they said so at the end 
of their reports; then they further recommended that a joint committee, con-
sisting of two members from the senate and five from the house, be appointed to 
present the address to the governor. Full reasons for the removal were given in 
the report of the committee, and dissenters were allowed to file a report of their 
own. When the house and the senate adopted the report, the address was taken 
by this special committee to the governor. . . . When the address went to the 
governor ... it consisted merely of a request for the removal of the judge, and 
did not state any reasons as did the report of the legislative committee. The 
governor, after the receipt of the address, presents the question of removal to the 
council, and if the council' and the governor favor it the latter issues a writ of 
removal, sending a message to the legislature to inform them of the fact that 
removal has taken place." Frothingham, note 47, supra at 219. 
68 See text at note 50, supra. A full text of the address of the legislature to 
the governor, and a letter of Bradbury ,to the governor are contained in Grinnell, 
note 47, supra. Bradbury died shortly after his removal' so that the problem of 
his support did not last long. Id. See Grinnell, Retirement of Judges, 40 Mass. 
L.Q. 40 (#2, 1955). 
24
Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law, Vol. 1972 [1972], Art. 27
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/asml/vol1972/iss1/27
694 1972 ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETTS LAW §24.8 
Convention of 1917-1918, the people of Massachusetts ratified the 58th 
Amendment which provided that "the governor, with the consent of the 
council, may after due notice and hearing retire . . . [all judicial officers] 
because of advanced age or mental or physical disability."69 This newer 
removal procedure, unlike the unrestricted and potentially harsh process 
of address, provides for a hearing and exempts the legislature from the 
removal process. It also includes a retirement provision which entitles 
the judges affected by it to three-fourths retirement pay.70 
The fourth and final method of removal was just recently added to 
the constitution when the voters ratified the 98th Amendment which 
requires all judges to retire upon reaching seventy years of age. Nearly 
half the states now have mandatory retirement ages for judges.71 
II. SUFFICIENCY OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESSES 
Except for cases of old age or disability, the formal, constitutional 
mechanisms for the removal of judges in Massachusetts remain in the 
form of either impeachment or address. In the extreme situation which 
calls for nothing short of removal of the judge, these processes are 
available, and they have been used, even if rarely.72 Unfortunately, ad-
dress and impeachment carry with them at least five basic, inherent 
problems: First, impeachment requires legislators to deal, in a non-
legislative manner, with judicial misconduct. In effect, the law makers 
are required to assume the role of judge in an area-that of judicial 
misconduct-with which they normally have little contact.73 It may also 
be questioned whether legislative processes are adequate for the fact-
finding, trial court procedure which impeachment, if not address, de-
mands.74 Second, the legislature might well be unable to find the time 
or the money 'to conduct address or impeachment proceedings.75 Third, 
69 Mass. Const. pt. 2, c. 3, art I. An earlier Constitutional' Convention in 
1853 has passed a resolution which abolished "good behavior" (life) tenure for 
judges and proposed a constitution which set the tenure of the justices of the 
Supreme Judicial Court at ten years and the tenure of the judges of the lower 
courts at seven years. The new cons,titution was rejected by the voters. See Drinan, 
Judicial Appointments for Life by the Executive Branch of Government: Re-
flections on the Massachusetts Experience, 44 Texas L. Rev. 1103, 1108 (1966). 
70 See G.L., c. 32, §65A. 
71 Winters and AlJard, Judicial Selection and Tenure in the United States, in 
AMERICAN ASSEMBLY, THE COURTS, THE PUBLIC AND THE LAW EXPLOSION 146, 
166-67 (Jones ed. 1965) [Hereinafter cited as Winters and Allard]. 
72 In a report published in 1970, it was noted that "only five states ... have 
used impeachment against judges within the last fifteen years, and no instance 
of the use of address, concurrent resolution, or recall (which exists in only seven 
states) [occurred] within the last three decades." Braithwaite, Judicial Mis-
conduct and How Four States Deal with It, 35 Law and Contemporary Problems 
151, 154 (1970) [herinafter cited as Braithwaite]' 
73 Shartel, Federal Judges-Appointment, Supervision and Removal-Some 
Possibilities Under the Constitution, 28 Mich. L. Rev. 485, 871 (1930). 
74 Id. at 871-73. 
75 Two states, Florida and Oklahoma, resorted to impeachment trials in the 
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if it did find the time and money, there is still no guarantee that the 
legislature would not be susceptible to partisan political influences. "Since 
the forum of decision is the legislature and legislators are partisan ad-
vocates by civic obligation and practical necessity, the ... criticism seems 
justified."76 Fourth, address and impeachment are processes which have 
all-or-nothing results: removal or retention. They -are systems of elimina-
tion rather than of judicial discipline, and any disciplinary effects that 
they may have on members of the judiciary must result from the threat 
of the ultimate sanction-removal. It is a threat that cannot carry much 
weight with the judge whose conduct, even if obnoxious, would not 
warrant removal by impeachment for misconduct and mal-administration. 
Nor should such a judge be especially bothered by the threat of removal 
by address. Unless his conduct has aroused and outraged the general 
public, the political difficulties in mobilizing the executive and the legis-
lature in an address proceeding would seem to rule against such a re-
moval. The threat is further neutralized by the virtual disuse into which 
these procedures for removal have fallen. The Trial of Prescott remains 
the only impeachment of a judge in Massachusetts history, and no judge 
has been removed by address in this century. In reality, impeachment 
and address are effective disciplinary mechanisms only in those cases 
where a judge's misconduct has been so blatant that nothing short of 
removal would satisfy the general public. Cases not amounting to public 
scandal ru;e not likely to result in any definitive action. 
1950's and 1960's. Each trial took about fifteen days of the legislature's time. 
The two trials of judges in Florida were estimated to have cost around $250,000. 
Both resulted in acquittal. In 1966, two years after the last impeachment trial, 
Florida changed its constitutional procedure for the removal of judges to that 
of the commission plan, discussed infra. See Dunn, Impeachment System Goes 
on Trial, in AMERICAN JUDICATURE SOCIETY, SELECTED READINGS ON THE An-
MINISTRATION OF JUSTICE AND ITs IMPROVEMENT 86-87 & n.1 (1969). Legislative 
time, exclusive of costs of investigation, in the trial of two Oklahoma Supreme 
Court Justices, was estimated at $50,000. After that trial, in 1966, the legislators 
of Oklahoma voted almost unanimously to change the constitutional procedure for 
the removal of judges to a system involving a Court on the Judiciary, discussed 
infra. See Hays, The Discipline and Removal' of Judges, An Oklahoma View, 50 
Judicature 64 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Hays]. 
76 Braithwaite, note 72, supra at 154. "What is wrong with impeachment? 
1. It is cumbersome. The legislature must either be in session or be called into 
session. Much time of all legislators is required which takes them from other 
duties. 2. It is expensive. In the Oklahoma case, legislative time alone amounted. 
to more than $50,000 in expenses in addition to the cost of investigation. Florida 
impeachment trial'S a short while ago were estimated to cost $250,000. 3. It is 
essentially political rather than judicial in nature. Widespread publicity and 
editorial comment put many senators under pressure to vote the sentiment of 
their constituents rather than their own. 4. If theser is a miscarriage of justice, 
there is no appeal. 5. The excessive publicity is damaging to the entire judicial 
system. Hays, note 75, supra. 
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III. DEVELOPMENT OF JUDICIAL SELF DISCIPLINE 
One of the results of the disuse of constitutional processes for judicial 
discipline and removal has been the partial assumption by the courts 
themselves of various disciplinary techniques utilizing statutory grants 
of administrative superintendence. The Supreme Judicial Court itself is 
given "general superintendence of the administration of all courts of 
inferior jurisdiction," including the power to issue such "orders, directions 
and rules as may be necessary or desirable for the furtherance of justice, 
the regular execution of the laws, the improvement of the administration 
of such courts, and the securing of their proper and efficient administra-
tion."77 Extrapolating from two recent opinions dealing with alleged 
misconduct on the part of two superior court judges,78 one commentator 
-now an Associate Justice of the Superior Court--outlined the bases 
of power, authority and jurisdiction of the Supreme Judicial Court to 
discipline judges: The Supreme Judicial Court has (1) inherent common 
law and constitutional power to protect and preserve the judicial system; 
(2) general supervisory powers conferred by statute (G.L., c. 211, §3, 
quoted in part above); (3) the power to maintain and impose discipline 
with respect to the conduct of all members of the bar (i.e., the power 
to disbar a judge) ;79 (4) the power, as a matter of judicial administra-
tion, to prevent a judge of an inferior court from exercising the powers 
and duties of his office; and (5) absolutely no power, regardless of the 
transgression, to remove any judge permanently from his judicial office.8o 
A more limited disciplinary power is conferred on the Chief Justice of 
the District Courts. He is empowered by statute with the "general super-
intendence of all the district courts, other than the municipal court of 
77 G.L., c. 211, §3. 
78 In re DeSaulnier, 1971 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1345, 274 N.E.2d 454; 1972 Mass. 
Adv. Sh. 65, 279 N.E.2d 296. 
79 It is not necessary, however, for a judge in Massachusetts to be a lawyer. 
There are at least two reported cases in Massachusetts of the disbarment of lawyers 
who were also judges. Each case involved essentially criminal conduct. Matter of 
Ruby, 328 Mass. 542, 105 N.E.2d 234 (1952) [requesting a bribe]; and Cen-
tracchio, petitioner, 345 Mass. 342 187 N.E.2d 383 (1961) [federal tax evasions, 
as well as breach of professional duty to clientsl. Both actions involved district 
court judges, but they both also dealt with criminal acts which would have 
warranted disbarment proceedings against lawyers who were not judges. 
80 Lynch, The President's Page, 16 Boston Bar J. 3, 9 (# 6, 1972) [hereinafter 
cited as Lynchl. In the DeSaulnier case, the Supreme Judicial Court did not and 
could not remove the judge permanently; prior to hearing he had not been 
assigned to Superior Court sessions with his own consent; after its findings, follow-
ing a full public hearing before the full court, the Supreme Judicial Court as a 
matter of judicial administration ordered him not to exercise the powers and 
duties of a judge, as the only interim remedy available pending action by the 
Legislature. The judge then resigned as a judge. Id. The DeSaulnier case was 
the first of its type in the history of the Superior Court. In re DeSaulnier, 1972 
Mass. Adv. Sh. 65, 85, 279 N.E.2d 296, 308. 
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the city of Boston, and their clerks and other officers."81 If any judicial 
officer within his jurisdiction fails to comply with an order of the Chief 
Justice of the District Courts in the performance of his powers and 
duties, then the matter may be referred to the Supreme Judicial Court. 
If, after a hearing, the Supreme Judicial Court finds such non-compliance, 
it "shall forthwith make an appropriate order as to the matter involved."82 
The DeSaulnier case represents a nonstatutory assumption of disci-
plinary powers by the judiciary. Superior Court Chief Justice McLaughlin, 
whose statutory powers of supervision are strictly limited, initiated an 
ad hoc investigation of the incident. The investigatory proceedings, while 
not illegal, had no statutory basis, and thus represented an outright 
assumption of disciplinary authority by the Chief Justice. 
What appears to have developed in Massachusetts is a complicated 
and ill-defined coalescence of judicial discipline (by the courts) and 
removal (by the executive and legislative branches) based on a dis-
jointed set of statutory and constitutional provisions. The definitions of 
acts which may trigger the mechanisms for discipline and removal are 
often abstruse, and the basic inertia of the machinery appears to be such 
that only the most blatant cases of judicial misbehavior will be forceful 
enough to set its ponderous wheels in motion. "In situations involving 
anything less than the most flagrant violations of judicial ethics or in-
disputable incompetency, legislators and citizens hesitate to take the 
trouble to initiate removal procedures."83 But even when citizens do 
attempt to make their grievances with a particular judge the basis for 
a disciplinary or removal action, the system has proven so ponderous 
and inefficient that it has frustrated not only those who bear the grievances 
but also those who deign to hear them out and determine the appropri-
ate action to be taken. Indeed, there is no statutory obligation on any 
public body or individual to hear such grievances unless they amount 
to complaints of criminal conduct. In one recent case involving a district 
court judge, there has been such a seemingly unjustified prolongation 
of the controversy as to result in embarrassment to the judiciary. The 
report of Chief Justice Flaschner's Grievance Committee on its investiga-
tion into administration of justice in the Dorchester District Court was 
released on April 20, 1972, and yet in 1973 the controversy still rages.84 
The report is a testament to the inefficiency of the current procedures 
for the discipline and removal of judges in Massachusetts at least insofar 
as 'they pertain to the district courts: 
81 G.L., c. 218, §43A. Under his authority, Chief Justice Flashner has 
established a Grievance Committee. 
82 Id. But no explicit disciplinary or suspension power is provided by the statute. 
83 Winters and Allard, note 71, supra at 167. 
84 TROY CASE BROADENED. The SJC has allowed the Boston Bar to broaden 
its inquiry into the actions of Judge Jerome P. Troy and has given it the power 
to summon witnesses. Retired Judge John V. Spaulding was named special com-
missioner in the case. 1 Mass. Lawyers We,ekly 79 (Feb. 5, 1973). 
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The office of the Chief Justice and his Grievance Committee can 
absorb and effectively handle some complaints, but when a. matter, 
such as the instant case, develops with attendant complexity, con-
troversy or publicity, it is entirely inappropriate for the office of 
the Chief Justice to be so engaged. Not only are there deficiencies 
in staff and time, but the disciplinary function in such an extra-
ordinary instance as this is misplaced and counter-productive in an 
office which should be devoted primarily to working out with Judges 
and other personnel in the District Courts policies and procedures 
for improvement in the administration of justice.85 
Conviction of a judge for a serious crime, especially one involving 
moral turpitude, probably would not pose any great problems for the 
existing system of judicial discipline and removal in Massachusetts. Quick 
removal on address would be the likely result. For somewhat lesser 
crimes, a judge might be disciplined by disbarment as were the judges in 
Matter of Ruby and Centracchio.86 However, problems may arise when 
a judge is charged with conduct which is not criminal or corrupt. For 
example, what actions could be taken against a judge whose behavior 
and demeanor on the bench "is illustrated by a lack of judicial poise or 
a disregard of established court practices-the type of behavior which 
does not necessarily render a judge unfit for the bench but which does 
make him less perfect and less worthy of his honored position ?"87 What 
action could be taken against a judge whose alleged misconduct is not 
so dramatic as to set in motion the constitutional processes for removal 
but which nevertheless has an eroding effect upon the efficient adminis-
tration of justice? Examples of such behavior may be habitual tardiness 
or intoxication, short hours, long vaoations, undignified courtroom be-
havior, arbitrary use of court powers, and extreme rudeness to lawyers, 
litigants, and witnesses.88 According to Chief Justice Tauro, 
85 Report on the Investigation into the Administration of Justice in the Muni-
cipal Court of the Dorchester District 9 (Apri¥ 20, 1972) quoted in Lynch, note 
80, supra at 13. 
86 See note 79, supra. 
87 Tauro, The Few and the Many, 51 Judicature 215, 216 (1968) (hereinafter 
cited as Tauro). 
88 Braithwaite, note 72, supra at 152. See also Buckley, The Commission on 
Judicial Qualifications: An Attempt to Deal with Judicial' Misconduct, 3 U.S.F.L. 
Rev. 244, 245-250 (1969). "[T]he Report of Chief Justice Flaschner's Grievance 
Committee [see supra note 80] concerns findings of non-criminal conduct in the 
judicial processing of criminal cases, i.e., lack of patience, concern, compassion 
and sensitivity toward defendants; non-compliance with law and required pro-
cedures; bail abuses; and mismanagement in the opera'tion of the Dorchester 
Municipal Court .... " Lynch, note 82, supra at 12. Judicial bad manners is a 
critical probl'em which renders a disciplinary technique vital. Although circum-
stances will not normally permit or justify removal, the public needs a tool to 
assert the standards of decency." Frankel, Judicial Conduct, Discipline and Re-
moval and Involuntary Retirement, in THE IMPROVEMENT OF THE ADMINISTRATION 
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It is my belief and experience that most higher courts throughout 
the country possess a small segment of members whose professional 
and personal attitude and conduct are detrimental to them and to 
their fellow justices. . . . The overriding characteristic of these 
judges is a careless disregard for established practices of the court 
necessary for coordination of effort and effectiveness of action and 
direction. "I'll do as I please" marks his general attitude.89 
To those who are aggrieved by such judges, no definitive, formal and 
strict disciplinary remedy is available in Massachusetts short of an appeal 
to those branches of the government having the constitutional power of 
removal. Instead, they must take their grievances to such loosely defined 
and basically powerless committees as the Chief Justice's Grievance Com-
mittee, which has already admitted a certain lack of legal and adminis-
trative competence in this area.90 
IV. THE NEED FOR NEW ALTERNATIVES 
Since all efficient court systems require that judges be given appropriate 
administrative authority, and while problems of judicial misconduct are 
admittedly and correctly within that authority, it is becoming increasingly 
evident that efficient and expeditious judicial discipline is not possible 
under the statutory administrative authority which presently exists. In a 
number of states, awareness of this fact has shown the necessity for, and 
resulted in the adoption of, workable apparatus for judicial discipline 
which exist outside the local court systems and which are available when 
needed. It has been said that the quality of justice is in large measure 
determined by the quality of the judiciary.91 The need for high standards 
of high judicial conduct is unquestioned. There is some objection, how-
ever, to the idea of subjecting judges to external, extrajudicial disciplin-
ary procedures. The tradition of an independent judiciary carries with 
it the notion of conscientious self-discipline. Opponents of formal dis-
ciplinary procedures feel that apart from cases involving criminal con-
duct, the maintenance of judicial ethical standards should rest completely 
in the conscience of the judge, and that purely judicial misconduct should 
not be the sU!bject of sanctions if the independence of the judiciary is to 
be inviolate. Many independence advocates would argue that a formal, 
easily accessible disciplinary mechanism would provide a means for un-
warranted attacks on judges and that existing methods of judicial disci-
pline are adequate. 
OF JUSTICE (A.B.A. Handbook) 55, 59 (5th ed. 1971) [Hereinafter cited as 
Frankel]. 
89 Tauro, note 87, supra at 216-17. 
90 See text at note 85, supra. 
91 PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF 
JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 146 (1967) [Herein-
after cited as The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society.]. 
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However, according to Jack E. Frankel, the Executive Secretary of 
the California Commission on Judicial Qualifications: 
[A] modem court system needs effective discipline and removal pro-
cedures. To maintain that a judge should be restrained only by his 
conscience is to restate the divine right of kings in a different guise. 
The concept of an independent judiciary does not necessarily en-
tail the immunity of judges from the rule of law. The American 
temperament rebels at the thought that pu!blic officials are above 
the law and beyond reasonable sanction. Abuse of the procedures 
should not be feared, since notions of fair play can be as applica.ble 
when the judge is being judged as when he is judging. Traditional 
methods of discipline have proven unsatisfactory. Public opinion, 
elections, and bar association action are ineffective against a re-
calcitrant judge, and the convening of the United States Senate or 
a busy state senate for a judge's impeachment proceeding is almost 
fanciful today. * * * 
In state after state, study after study, conference after conference, 
the need for fair but effective disciplinary measures for maintaining 
judicial fitness has been proved.92 
Some of the advantages of such a formal judicial disciplinary procedure 
are that it would protect judges from harrassment as much as it would 
see to the maintenance of their ethical standards; by relieving the legis-
lature from such non-legislative matters it would provide the best op-
portunity for the questions of misconduct or disa!bility to be decided 
on their merits; and it would eliminate, to a great extent, the political 
pressures and influence to which Jegislators, the executive, and even bar 
associations are subject. 93 
A growing number of states are adopting formal procedures for the 
discipline and removal of judges through judicial action. Such procedures 
usually involve one of two methods. One system, examples of which may 
be found in New York and Oklahoma,94 uses a completely separate 
92 Frankel, Judicial Discipline and Removal, 44 Texas L. Rev. 1117, 1118-19 
(1966) . 
93 Id. at 1120. 
94 The New York system of an independent tribunal, called the Court on the 
Judiciary, was created by constitutional amendment in 1947. N.Y. Canst. art. 
VI, §22. It was created as an addition to, and not a replacement for, pre-
existing methods of removal which included impeachment, N.Y. Canst. art. VI, 
§24; removal by concurrent resolution of both houses of the legislature, N.Y. Const. 
art. VI §23a; and removal of lower court judges by the Appellate Division, N.Y. 
Const. art. VI, §22i. The court itself is composed of six members: the chief 
judge and senior associate judge of the Court of Appeals (the state's highest 
court), and one judge from each of the four departments of the Appellate Division 
of the SUPreIl!e Court, selected by a majority of the judges in each department 
whenever the Court an the Judiciary is convened. N.Y. Const. art. VI, §22b. It 
has statewide jurisdiction and is empowered to remove judges for cause and to 
retire judges for mental or physical disability upon the concurrence of four or 
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tribunal, not subordinate to any other court, to hear cases on judicial 
misconduct. The other system, examples of which may be found in Cali-
fornia 'and Florida,95 uses a procedure of investigation and hearing, with 
recommendations made to the Supreme Court or highest appellate court 
of the state, which court orders the discipline or removal. The procedure 
is entirely confidential until the report is filed with the high court. Varia-
tions on the two systems exist in other states.96 
In at least two of those other states, Florida and Oklahoma, the 
impetus to adopt a new formal system of judicial discipline through 
judicial action can be traced directly to bad experiences with the more 
mDre Df its members. N.Y. CDnst. art. VI, §22c. The pDwers Df the CDurt-tD 
appDint attorneys, summDn witnesses and dDcuments, etc., and the rights Df the 
respDndents nDtice, Dpportunity to. be heard, etc., are the usual Dnes. N.Y. CDnst. 
art. VI, §22f. Any case under its cDnsideratiDn, except fDr a disability case, may 
be pre-empted by the initiatiDn Df a disciplinary prDceeding in the legislature. 
N.Y. CDnst. art. V. §22e. The CDurt has no. permanent staff Dr cDntinuDus existence 
as a bDdy, and it may be called into. existence Dnly by the Chief Judge Df the 
CDurt Df Appeals, the gDvernDr, the executive cDmmittee Df the state bar assDcia-
tiDn, Dr any Df the presiding judges Df the Appell'ate DivisiDn departments. N.Y. 
CDnst. art. VI, §22d. The CDurt has been cDnvened three times since it was 
established, resul'ting in two. remDv,als and two. "rebukes and reprimands." An 
aCCDunt Df its three cases may be fDund in Braithwaite, nDte 72, supra, at 160-62. 
95 The CalifDrnia CDmmissiDn Dn Judicial QualificatiDns was established by 
cDnstitutiDnal amendment in 1960. It is basically ,a hearing agency, authDrized to. 
receive and investigate cDmplaints Dn five specified grounds: 1. wilful miscDnduct 
in Dffice; 2. wilful and persistent failure to. perfDrm duties; 3. habituall intemper-
ance; 4. disability which is likely to' becDme permanent; and 5. cDnduct prejudicial 
to. the administratiDn Df justice which brings the judicial Dffice into. disrepute. 
Cal. CDnst. art. VI, § 18c. If, after investigatiDns and a hearing which are CDn-
fidential by law, the cDmmissiDn deems that censure, remDval, Dr fDrced retire-
ment is warranted, it may recDmmend such actiDn to' the state Supreme CDurt 
which is empDwered, after publicly reviewing the facts, to. remDve the judge's 
rights to. Dffice and pensiDn, to. cDmpel1 his retirement, Dr to. censure him. Cal. 
CDn9t. art. VI, §18d. The cDmmissiDn, which meets regularly and may receive 
cDmplaints from anyone, is cDmposed Df five members Df the judiciary, two' 
members Df the bar and two' laymen, all Df whDm are unsalaried and serve fDr 
fDur year terms. Cal. CDnst. art. VI, §8. In the fir9t ten years Df its existence, the 
cDmmissiDn began investigatiDns Dn hundreds Df cDmplaints. In SDme instances 
the instigatiDn Df these cDnfidential proceedings wDuld be fDllDwed by the vDlun-
tary retirement Df the judge in questiDn. Frankel, nDte 92, supra at 1128. Only 
two. cases had full proceedings thDugh to' the state Supreme CDurt in that time. 
In Dne, the CDurt refused to' fDllDW the cDmmissiDn's recDmmendatiDns fDr remDval, 
and in the Dther it gave the recDmmended censure. Braithwaite, nDte 72, supra at 
164. 
96 CDurtS Dn the Judiciary are prDvided fDr in Alabama, Hawaii, IllinDis, In-
diana. IDwa, LDuisiana, New Jersey, New YDrk, ND,rth Carolina, Oklahoma, Texas 
and Virginia. CommissiDns exist in Alaska, CalifDrnia, FIDrida, Idaho., LDuisiana, 
Maryland, Michigan, Nebraska, New Mexico., Ohio., OregDn, Pennsylvania, Texas 
and Utah. As Df 1968, propDsals fDr cDmmissiDns were in variDus stages Df con-
sideratiDn in GeDrgia, Indiana, IDwa, Missouri, MDntana, Nevada, NDrth DakDta 
and West Virginia. AMERICAN JUDICATURE SOCIETY, JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE AND 
REMOVAL (Report No.5 April 1968). 
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traditional legislative method of impeachment.97 Probahly as a result 
of their judicial characteristics, the plans have met with negligible op-
position by members of the judiciary, and they have been almost unani-
mously lauded by the commentators.98 The Oalifornia commission system 
in particular, with its easy accessibility for any aggrieved party and· its 
confidential investigations, has been most favorably received.99 
As of this writing, three bills are pending in the Massachusetts legis-
lature, each of which would amend the constitution to provide for judicial 
grievance committees similar to the California Commission on Judicial 
Qualifications.1OO Such an amendment, while not to be adopted lightly 
or without serious consideration, should be encouraged. Massachusetts 
has virtually no system for judicial discipline as such. From the judge's 
point of view, those processes which do exist for judicial discipline may 
seem extremely unjust and arbitrary when applied. The prerogatives of 
the legislature and the executive are not in jeopardy. Existing 'processes 
for removal can be maintained, as has been the case in New York and 
California. If the experiences of other states are accepted, the indepen-
dence of the judiciary would not be jeopardized by such changes. What 
is and always should be our concern is the quality of our judiciary, for 
that is the key to the quality of our justice. 
No procedural or administrative reforms will help the courts, and 
no reorganizational plan will avail unless judges have the highest 
97 See AMERICAN JUDICATURE SOCIETY, SELECTED READINGS ON THE ADMINIS~ 
TRATION OF JUSTICE AND ITs IMPROVEMENT 86-89, 93-94 (1967). 
98 See Burke [Justice of the Supreme Court of Californial, Judicial Discipline 
and Removal: The California Story, 48 J. Am. Jud. Soc'y 167 (1965); Buckley, 
The Commission on Judicial Qualifications: An Attempt to Deal with Judicial 
Misconduct, 3 UJS.F. L. Rev. 244 (1969); and Note, Remedies for Judicial Mis-
conduct and Disability: Removal and Discipline of Judges, 41 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 
149 (1966). 
99 Cumbersome procedures [for involuntary retirement and removal of judges1 
e.g., impeachment, should be supplemented by effective machinery for theinvesti-
gation of complaints against judges and for the removal of those found unfit or 
guilty of misconduct in office. The commission plan of judicial removal adopted 
by constitutional amendment in California in 1960 seems admirably designed for 
these purposes and is worthy of adoption in other states. Recommendation No.7 
of the 27th American Assembly on the Courts the Public and the Law Explosion, 
April 29-May 2, 1965. The President's Commission on Law Enforcement and the 
Administration of Justice recommends: States should establish commissions on 
judicial conduct taking the approach used in California and Texas. The Challenge 
of CTime in a FTee Society, note 91, supTa at 147. In a similar vein in Recom-
mendation No.5 of the Concensus of the National Conference on Judicial Selec-
tion and Court Administration, 1959, sponsored by the A.B.A., the American 
Judicature Society and the Institute of Judicial Administration, Inc. 
100 Mass. Senate Bil[ 572, Mass. House Bill 1375, Mass. House Bill 4532. 
Senate 572 is the most thorough of the bills, and is the most similar to a Cali-
fornia plan. It is proposed to make it even more thorough by means of an 
amendment proffered by the Coalition for Better Judges, 48 Inman Street Cam-
bridge, Massachusetts 02139. ' 
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qualifications, are fully trained and competent, and have high stand-
ards of performance.lOl 
TRAVER C. SMITH, JR. 
STUDENT COMMENT 
§24.9. Non-constitutional processes: Judicial self-discipline in Massa-
chusetts: In Re DeSaulnier.l In the summer of 1971, Michael Raymond, 
a reputed underworld figure, appeared before a Congressional subcom-
mittee investigating organized crime. His testimony raised serious ques-
tions concerning the conduct of two Massachusetts Superior Court 
Justices, Edward DeSaulnier and Vincent' Brogna, and prompted a con-
fidential investigation into their activities by Superior Court Chief Justice 
Walter McLaughlin, Sr. Following submission of Chief Justice Mc-
Laughlin's report, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, sitting 
en bane, conducted a formal hearing to investigate the conduct of Judges 
DeSaulnier and Brogna. 
In In Re DeSaulnier, the Court essentially confirmed Raymond's allega-
tions. It found that in 1962, Raymond paid Charles Baker, a bailbonds-
man, $60,000 in consideration for Judge DeSaulnier's attempt to obtain 
a favorable disposition of a larceny case2 pending before Judge Brogna 
in which Raymond was a defendant.3 Judge DeSaulnier communicated 
with Judge Brogna, without objection, in an attempt to influence the 
case.4 Following a restitution agreement between Raymond and his vic-
tims!> and a series of continuances,6 Judge Brogna gave Raymond a 
suspended sentence and placed him on probation (following the recom-
mendation of the District Attorney's Office).7 At a meeting with Ray-
mond and Baker following disposition of the case, Judge DeSaulnier 
made reference to a telephone conversation with Judge Brogna and ex-
pressed his pleasure in doing business with Raymond.s 
In addition to the Raymond incident, the Court found that: (1) Judge 
DeSaulnier, while a member of the Committee on Bail, "frequented 
places of entertainment outside the Commonwealth" with Nathan Baker, 
a bailbondsman, and Baker did on occasion lend money to Judge De-
101 The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society, note 91, supra at 146. 
§24.9. 1 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. 65, 279 N.E.2d 296. 
2 Id. at 70, 74, 279 N.E.2d at 300, 302. 
3 Raymond was charged with larceny of approximately $17,000 from Sylvia 
Barrows and larceny of approximately $18,000 from Evelyn Lewis. The indict-
ment alleged his "fraudulent exchange of worthless oil and gas leases for cash 
and marketable securities owned by Miss Lewis." rd. at 68, 279 N.E.2d at 299. 
4 Id. at 76, 279 N.E.2d at 303. 
!> Id. Raymond agreed to pay Miss Lewis $8,000 in discharge of her claim 
and Mrs. Barrows $7,000 in discharge of her claim. 
6 rd. at 72-74, 279 N.E.2d at 301-302. 
7 rd. at 78, 279 N.E.2d at 304. Raymond was placed on probation for three 
years subject to his fulfilling hi.s restitution agreement. 
SId. at 79, 279 N.E.2d at 305. 
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Saulnier; (2) Judge DeSaulnier placed long distance telephone calls, 
not involving official court business, which were charged to Berkshire 
County; and (3) Judge DeSaulnier was issued a real estate broker's 
license while on the bench.9 
In DeSaulnier, the Supreme Judicial Court was confronted by four 
major issues: (1) whether it had jurisdiction to hear the case; (2) what 
rules of procedure and evidence should govern the proceeding, which 
was without precedent in this Commonwealth; (3) what kind of be-
havior constitutes judicial misconduct warranting punitive sanctions; 
and (4) what range of sanctions the Supreme Judicial Court is em-
powered to employ. 
The Supreme Judicial Court held that it had the authority and the 
duty to investigate judicial misconduct occurring either inside or outside 
the courtroom.10 The Court, in formulating rules for the conduct of such 
a proceeding, held that the usual rules of court would govern, but that 
where the public interest required, strict adherence to the formal rules 
would not be demanded.11 On the question of standards of conduct for 
judges, the Court placed primary emphasis on the need for judicial 
behavior to conform to the public's expectation 'of appropriate judicial 
conduct. The Court concluded that all judicial conduct should reinforce 
the belief in an impartial and honest judiciary.12 Where deviation from 
this norm is sufficient to warrant a finding of "serious judicial mis-
conduct,"13 the Court held that it is empowered to order punitive sanc-
tions.14 Finding that Judge DeSaulnier's conduct had rendered him unfit 
to serve as a judge or as a member of the bar, the Court disbarred him 
and ordered him to discontinue the exercise of his judicial duties. 15 Judge 
Brogna was censured for failing to report the attempt to influence his 
disposition of the Raymond case.16 
1. JURISDICTION 
Counsel for DeSaulnier and Brogna contended that the Supreme Ju-
dicial Court lacked jurisdiction to entertain the case, claiming that im-
peachment and address were the exclusive means by which judges may 
be disciplined in Massachusetts. The Massachusetts Constitution provides: 
"[t]he senate shall be a court with full authority to hear and determine 
all impeachments made by the house of representatives, against any 
officer or officers of the commonwealth, for misconduct and maladminis-
9 Id. at 82, 279 N.E.2d at 306-07. 
10 Id. at 83-84, 279 N.E.2d 307-08. 
11 In re DeSaulnier, 1971 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1345, 1348, 274 N.E.2d 454, 457. 
See Matter of Welansky, 319 Mass. 205,207, 65 N.E.2d 202, 203 (1946). 
12 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 85, 279 N.E.2d at 308. 
13 Id. at 84, 279 N.E.2d at 308. 
14 1971 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1347, 274 N.E.2d at 456. 
15 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 89, 279 N.E.2d at 310. 
16 Id. at 89, 279 N.E.2d at 311. 
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tration in their offices."17 An official who is convicted by the Senate is 
removed from office and may be disqualified from holding office in 
state government.18 The Massachusetts Constitution also expressly pro-
vides for the removal of judges by address: "All judicial officers . . . 
shall hold their offices during good behavior . . . nevertheless, the gov-
ernor, with consent of the council may remove them upon the address 
of both houses of the legislature.19 
Although conceding that these provisions give the other branches of 
government "primary responsibility for removal of judges,"20 the Court 
concluded that the judiciary also possesses a disciplinary authority which 
derives from (1) its "inherent common law power . . . to supervise the 
administration of justice,"21 (2) its power "to establish and enforce rules 
of court,"22 (3) its authority to discipline and disbar attorneys,23 and 
(4) its general statutory power to superintend the administration of all 
courts.2+ The Court placed particular emphasis upon its disbarment 
authority as illustrated by the case of In Re Ruby25 and the general 
superintendence statute. 
In In Re Ruby, the Supreme Judicial Court upheld the decision of a 
single Justice disbarring Ruby, a judge in the district court of Williams-
town, for requesting money from an individual who had an eviction 
action pending in the judge's court.26 It was clear on the record that a 
solicitation had occurred, the only question being whether Ruby had 
asked for a gift or for a loan. The Court, feeling that distinction not 
to be crucial,27 affirmed the disbarment, treating the case as a simple 
17 Mass. Const., pt. 2, c. 1, 12, art. 8. 
18 Id. 
19 Mass. Const., pt. 2, c. 3, art. 1. 
20 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. 65, 84-85, 279 N.E.2d 296, 308. 
21 Id. at 84, 279 N.E.2d at 307. 
22 Id. 
23 Id. 
2+ Id. The statute reads: "Superintendence of inferior courts; power to issue 
writs and process. The supreme judicial court shall have general superintendence 
of all courts of inferior jurisdiction to correct and prevent errors and abuses 
therein if no other remedy is expressly provided; and it may issue writs of error, 
certiorari, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and all other writs and processes 
to such courts and to corporations and individuals which may be necessary to 
the furtherance of justice and to the regular execution of the laws. 
"In addition to the foregoing, the justices of the supreme judicial court shall 
also have general superintendence of the administration of all courts of inferior 
jurisdiction, including, without limitation, the prompt hearing and disposition of 
matters pending therein, and the functions set forth in three c; and it may issue 
such writs, summonses and other processes and such orders, directions and rules 
as may be necessary or desirable for the furtherance of justice, the regular exe-
cution of the laws, the improvement of the administration of such courts, and 
the securing of their proper and efficient administration. " 
25 328 Mass. 542, 105 N.E.2d 234 (1952). 
26 Id. at 544, 105 N.E.2d at 235. 
27 Id. at 547, 105 N.E.2d at 237. 
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disbannent of a lawyer who also happened to be a judge. This penalty 
was solely operative against Ruby qua lawyer, without regard to possible 
punishment against him as a judge. Nor was there any discussion in 
Ruby of any authority under which the Court might impose any sanction 
other than disbarment. Thus, after the Ruby case, it was clear that the 
Court had authority to investigate judicial misconduct brought to its 
attention by a Bar Association complaint and to disbar a judge who was 
also an attorney. The decision did not reach the questions of the Court's 
authority to initiate an independent inquiry into judicial wrongdoing or 
its powers to move against a judge in his judicial capacity. 
The history of the general superintendence statute28 indicates that it 
was probably not intended it to authorize judicial inquiries into alleged 
misconduct. The statute is entitled "Superintendence of inferior courts; 
power to issue writs and process." As originally enacted the statute, under 
a general superintendence clause, authorized the Supreme Judicial Court 
to issue writs to correct errors in matters pending in the lower courts.29 
A second paragraph was added in 1956 to confer broader authority on 
the Supreme Judicial Court to superintend the administration of all 
lower courts by issuing "such orders, directions and rules as may be 
necessary. "30 
The amendment's history dates back to 1954, when the governor 
appointed a judicial survey commission to study the administration of 
justice in the courts of Massachusetts.31 The committee's recommenda-
tions32 ranged from the appointment of an administrator of the courts 
to creation of pensions for judges. All of its recommendations were 
specific proposals, and none involved judicial discipline by the judiciary. 
These recommendations were sent by the governor to the House of 
Representatives for legislative consideration. However, the legislature 
adopted only three of the commission's recommendations,33 and in 
28 G.L., c. 211, §3. 
29 This has been retained as the first paragraph of the present statute. See 
note 31, infra. 
30 See note 24, supra. 
31 1956 Mass. H.R. Journ. 604-605. 
32 1956 Mass. H.R. Journ. 605. The recommendations by the Judicial' Sur-
vey Commission were as follows: ( 1) appointing an Administrator of the Courts, 
(2) granting of full-rule-making power to the Supreme Judicial Court, (3) giving 
the superior court the power to prescribe forms of pleading in law cases, ( 4) 
establishing of a fifteen dollar jury fee, (5) providing for limited oral depositions 
before trial in the superior court, (6) continmngthe present temporary act 
permitting district court justices to sit in the superior court on misdemeanor 
and motor vehicle tort cases with certain amendments, (7) extending full-time 
judicial services in the district courts, . (8) giving the Administrative Committee 
of the probate courts the power to prescribe and enforce uniform practices and 
procedures, (9) providing pensions for judges appointed after July 31, 1956 only 
if they resign within thirty days after having completed ten years. service and 
having reached the age of seventy. 
33 1956 Mass. H.R. Journ. 1978. The legislature had adopted legislation 
giving the superior court the power to prescribe forms of pleading, continuing 
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August of 1956 the governor sent a letter to the House proposing their 
re-evaluation of the other proposals.34 The governor strongly recom-
mended legislation establishing an Executive Secretary to the Justices 
of the Supreme Judicial Court.35 Such a proposal had recently been 
rejected by the House, apparently for fear that it might authorize the 
secretary to investigate complaints involving the nonjudicial duties of 
court officers.36 The governor in his message to the House suggested 
that a Senate proposal had eliminated that possibility.37 The Senate's 
proposal charged the executive secretary with certain administrative 
responsibilities, but it strictly limited his duties to matters pertaining to 
the judicial system.38 This proposal was adopted by the House in "An 
Act Providing for the Administration of the Courts and an Executive 
Secretary to the Justices of the Supreme Judicial Court."39 As finally 
enacted, it amended G.L., c. 211, §3 by expanding the scope of superin-
tendence to include court administration, and it established the office 
of executive secretary, whose duties corresponded closely to that ex-
panded definition of superintendence.4<l At the time of its passage the 
notion that this statute might authorize the Court to investigate and 
discipline judges for judicial misconduct was apparently far beyond the 
contemplation of the legislature. 
To justify its broad interpretation of the statute, the DeSaulnier Court 
relied upon the admittedly expansive language of the law and a Michigan 
Supreme Court decision construing a similar provision in the Michigan 
Constitution. In Re Graham41 involved a Michigan probate judge who 
requested a $20,000 loan from the guardian of a ward's estate.42 The 
Michigan Supreme Court initially refrained from taking any disciplinary 
action until the legislature had acted on the court's recommendation 
that the judge be removed.43 When the legislature failed to remove 
Graham, the court enjoined Graham "from exercising the powers and 
duties of ... [his] office."44 The court based its authority on the provi-
the law of allowing district court justices to sit in the superior court on mis-
demeanors and motor vehicle tort cases, and providing for limited oral de-
positions before trial in the superior court. 
34 1956 Mass. H.R. Journ. 1979. 
35 Id. 
36 Id. 
37 Id. 
38 1956 Mass. S. Journ. 450, 797, 1256, 1281, 1292. Among the duties of 
the executive secretary were the examination of administrative records, examina-
tion of the dockets of the courts, investigation and collection of statistical data 
about the expenditure of public money in the operation of the courts, and 
investigation of complaints concerning the operation of the courts. 
39 Aots of 1956, c. 707. 
4<l Id. 
41 366 Mich. 268, 114 N.W.2d 333 (1962). 
42 Id. at 272-273, 114 N.W.2d at 334. 
43 Id. at 279-280, 114 N.W.2d at 338. 
44 Id. at 280-281, 114 N.W.2d at 338 [Reporter's NoteJ. 
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sion in the 1908 Michigan Constitution giving the Supreme Court "gen-
eral superintending control over all inferior courts."45 Ironically, one 
year later when the Michigan Constitution of 1963 became effective, it 
specifically stated that "the Supreme Court shall not have the power 
to remove a judge."46 The Michigan Supreme Court, in a subsequent 
case concerning Graham, stated in dictum that the court's injunction 
against Graham did not constitute removal since Graham was still able 
to collect his pay.47 
While the DeSaulnier court correctly focused upon the linguistic simi-
larities of the Michigan and Massachusetts provisions, it glossed over the 
significant difference between statutory construction and constitutional 
interpretation. Constitutional language is meant to be dynamic. A court 
may be justified in giving a more expansive construction to constitutional 
language than the plain meaning of the words might dictate or than 
the drafters of the Constitution might have foreseen. On the other hand, 
statutory language is usually narrower in scope and is to be read care-
fully in light of its legislative history. G.L., c. 4, §648 sets out the rules 
for construction of statutes. The section states that rules of construction 
are only to be employed where they would not result in a "construction 
inconsistent with the manifest intent of the lawmaking body." Extracting 
this "manifest intent" test from the canons of statutory construction and 
applying it to the instant case, there is at least a reasonable possibility 
that the Supreme Judicial Court's construction of c. 211, §3, in DeSaulnie:r 
was manifestly inconsistent with the legislative purpose. 
Most interestingly, the Supreme Judicial Court's resolution of the 
jurisdictional issue leaves open two rna jor policy questions: ( 1) whether 
judicially imposed discipline is the best way to promote public confidence 
in the judiciary,. and (2) whether the Court should ordinarily request 
legislative action before it proceeds to impose judicial sanctions. What 
would have been the result, for example, had the legislature voted against 
impeachment of Judge DeSaulnier after the order issued by the Supreme 
Judicial Court? To avoid needless friction -between the branches of 
government, these questions should be clarified prior to the next judicial 
self-discipline proceeding.49 
II. RULES GoVERNING THE IIEAluNG 
The DeSaulnier case presented unique procedural problems because 
the Supreme Judicial Court sat, in a sense, as a trial court and heard 
45 Mich. Const., Art. VII, §4 (1908). 
46 Mich. Const., Art. VI, §4 (1963). 
47 Ransford v. Graham, 374 Mich. 104, 108, 131 N.W.2d 201, 203 (1964). 
48 G.L., c. 4, §6 reads: "Rules for construction of statutes. In construing statutes 
• • . rules shall be observed, unless their observance would involve a construction 
inconsistent with the manifest intent of the law-making body or repugnant to 
the context of the same statute." 
49 As of this. writing, such a proceeding is about to commence in the case of 
Dorchester District Court Judge Jerome Troy. 
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testimony from witnesses. Definitionally, the hearing was a trial in that 
it was "a judicial examination in accordance with law ... of the issue."50 
As such, the accused were entitled to basic due process guarantees. The 
Supreme Judicial Court sought to assure this in several ways. The judges 
were represented by their own counsel throughout the proceeding. Evi-
dence against the judges was presented by specially appointed counsel, 
Edward B. Hanify and John M. Harrington.51 Their appointment was 
designed to insure the separation of prosecutional and judicial functions, 
a problem with clear constitutional implications52 which might have 
arisen had the Supreme Judicial Court conducted the proceeding on a 
non-adversary basis. 
On the other hand, the Court never clearly characterized the proceed-
ing as civil or criminal and hence the exact quantum of due process 
required was not set forth. This confusion as to the nature of the pro-
ceeding was illustrated by the standard which the Court established for 
the burden of proof which must be met before "serious misconduct" 
could be found. The Court rejected both the simple "preponderance of 
the evidence" test which is commonly employed in civil actions and the 
"beyond a reasonable doubt" standard which applies in criminal prosecu-
tions. Instead, it chose a middle course, utilizing a "fair preponderance 
of the evidence" test.53 
This choice was probably influenced by practical as well as legal 
considerations. Since the statute of limitations had expired with regard 
to the illegal activity alleged in De8aulnier, there was little likelihood 
of a subsequent criminal prosecution. Thus, the protection of the ac-
cused did not require application of the criminal law standard. Secondly, 
the charges excited public opinion and bore directly on a major public 
interest, the integrity of the judicial system. Employing a standard which 
would require finding "beyond a reasonable doubt" might have led to a 
situation where considerable evidence could have been gathered to support 
the charges, yet a reasonable doubt existed. A finding of innocence under 
such circumstances might have caused widespread public dissatisfaction 
with the entire disciplinary procedure and public confidence in the 
judiciary system. Finally, the time lag between the hearing and the 
alleged improprieties was so great as to make improbable any findings 
"beyond a reasonable doubt." 
On the other hand, the Court was not about to employ a standard 
which would result in a finding of guilt based on a small quantum of 
evidence. It recognized the severity of the charges and the repercussions 
of a guilty finding not only upon the future of the accused, but, on the 
entire judicial system. Lawyers and judges throughout the state would 
50 BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1675 (4th ed. 1968). 
51 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 65, 279 N.E.2d at 298. 
52 Id. It is basic to due process that there be an impartial trier of fact; this 
cannot be achieved when prosecutorial and faot-finding functions are merged. 
53 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 67, 279 N.E.2d at 299. 
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be affected by the public's reaction to the proceeding. These factors 
militated against the Court's adoption of a "preponderance of the evi-
dence" standard. In conclusion, the Court selected a standard which it 
felt would further the twin aims of the proceeding-to protect the rights 
of the accused and to simultaneously police the fairness and impartiality 
of the judiciary. 
In view of this delicate balancing of interests, one is tempted to 
characterize the proceeding as quasi-criminal, in some sense akin to a 
forfeiture proceeding. Such a characterization would impose a higher 
obligation to provide due process safeguards, particularly with regard 
to the admissibility of evidence. In The 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsyl-
vania,54 the United States Supreme Court held that liquor seized in viola-
tion of the Fourth Amendment prohibition against illegal searches and 
seizures was not admissible in a forfeiture proceeding. In applying the 
exclusionary rule, the Court recognized that forfeiture proceedings, though 
only quasi-criminal in nature, were subject to the mandate of the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.55 
If one accepts the forfeiture analogy, the rather casual manner in 
which the DeSaulnier court determined the admissibility of certain evi-
dence is cause for concern. While the Court stated that the usual rules 
of court would apply, 56 it cited to Matter of Welansky.57 In Welansky, 
the Supreme Judicial Court held that an attorney's conviction for in-
voluntary manslaughter constituted sufficient grounds for disbarment. 
The Court noted that a disbarment proceeding was "neither an action 
at law in the strict sense nor a suit in equity," and that "the strict rules 
of evidence may not invariably apply"58 where the advancement of 
public justice is at stake. Application of this public interest standard may 
well have created confusion as to what evidence generally excludable 
would be admissible "in the public interest." This is especially trouble-
some with regard to the admission of hearsay evidence. In view of the 
Sixth Amendment right to confront adverse witnesses, the use of hearsay 
would be grounds for constitutional objection if the quasi-criminal classi-
fication is valid. To eliminate any taint of unconstitutionality and to 
assure procedural fairness, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court 
should have promulgated exact rules governing judicial inquiries into 
alleged judicial misconduct prior to the hearing. It should certainly do 
so in the future. 
III. STANDARDS FOR JUDICIAL MISCONDUCT 
The Supreme Judicial Court held that it had authority to discipline 
a judge of an inferior court for "serious judicial misconduct."59 How-
54 380 U.S. 693 (1965). 
55 Id. at 702 
56 See note 16, supra. 
57 319 Mass. 205, 65 N.E.2d 202 (1946). 
58 Id. at 207, 65 N.E.2d at 203. 
59 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 84, 279 N.E.2d at 308. 
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ever, the ethical standards for determining judicial wrongdoing had not 
been previously defined in Massachusetts. For guidance, the Court drew 
heavily upon the American Bar Association's Canons of Judicial Ethics 
and adopted the ABA policy that not only should judges be honest and 
fair, but also their conduct inside and outside the courtroom should 
promote that belief in the eyes of the public.6o To effectuate that policy, 
the Court construed G.L., c. 212, §2761 as henceforth prohibiting all 
Massachusetts judges from engaging in any business-related activities 
from which they might derive profit.62 It further concluded that public 
gambling by a judge was "incompatible" with confidence in the courts 
as was a judge's intimate relationship with an individual whose conduct 
he must regulate.63 In view of those standards, Judge DeSaulnier's com-
munication with Judge Brogna and Judge Brogna's failure to disclose 
it were held to be grossly improper. The opinion leaves little doubt that 
such conduct will not be tolerated and that it does indeed constitute 
serious misconduct. However, the Court failed to state which of these 
acts, standing alone, would satisfy the "serious misconduct" test which 
the opinion set forth. 
The central difficulty with the "serious misconduct" test is vagueness. 
In a case such as DeSaulnier the serious misconduct test can be satis-
factorily applied because of the cumulative effect of multiple instances of 
judicial impropriety. Looking at the pattern of activity set out in De-
Saulnier, it can reasonably be said that such conduct, taken as a whole, 
so fails to conform to public expectations of judicial behavior that it calls 
for punitive measures. The point at which one reaches this judgment, 
however, is not clear. This is best exemplified by differing treatment of 
DeSaulnier and Brogna. Brogna's failure to disclose DeSaulnier's inter-
vention in the Raymond case obviously constituted some form of mis-
conduct as evidenced by the Court's censure. Yet, it was not such serious 
or gross misconduct as to warrant disbarment or an order prohibiting 
exercise of judicial duties. 
Perhaps the rule to be distilled from the Court's analysis is that any 
deviation from the norms described in the American Bar Association 
canons is serious misconduct per se and that the degree of seriousness 
will dictate the nature of the disciplinary measure. Such a rule would 
still leave open the question of suspect judicial conduct which does not 
fall within the proscriptions of the canons,64 but it would give judges a 
60 Id. at 86, 279 N.E.2d at 309. 
61 G.L., c. 212, §27. "Salaries, etc. of justices; practice of law prohibited .... 
Such justices shall devote their entire time during business hours to their respec-
tive duties and shall not, directly or indirectly, engage in the practice of law." 
62 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 88, 279 N.E.2d at 310. 
63 Id. 
64 Whil'e fiscal and ethical improprieties fall within the American Bar Asso-
ciation Canons of Judicial Ethics, it is not clean whether the professional code 
extends to judicial misconduct in the performance of judicial duties. Does it, for 
example, cover allegations of a pattern of judicial discrimination against a class 
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clearer idea of what is and is not permissible conduct. Whether the Court 
intended to enunciate such a broad rule ill likely to be determined in the 
Troy case,65 now pending before the Court. 
IV. REUEF 
"As a matter of judicial administration,"66 the Supreme Judicial Court 
disbarred Judge DeSaulnier and ordered him to refrain from further 
exercising his judicial duties. The Court alliO censured Judge Brogna for 
his conduct. Subsequently, the Court sent the transcript of the proceeding 
ro the Governor and the General Court for "appropriate" action.67 
While disbarment and censure are traditional sanctiom employed by 
courts to discipline members of the bar including judges,68 the order 
restraining Judge DeSau1nier from performing his judicial functiom was 
not. As a somewhat novel remedy, it merits particular attention. 
First of all, the Supreme Judicial Court stopped short of ordering the 
removal of Judge DeSaulnier. It was apparently unprepared to arrogate 
to itself the power to remove a judge as a means of judicial discipline 
in light of the comtitutional methods of removal provided by impeach-
ment and address. Ostemibly, the purpose of sending the transcript to 
of litigants regularly appearing before the court? The prohibition of Canon 
One against conduct ''prejudicial to the administration of justice" may weIr be 
sufficiently broad to encompass this second major type of judicial misconduct. 
The issue of whether the Supreme Judicial Court may discipline judges for 
bias while exercising their judicial powers is now squarely before the Court in 
the case of Dorchester District Court Judge Jerome Troy. The Troy inquiry is 
the product of an earlier federal court case, Haley v. Troy, 338 F. Supp. 794 
(D. Mass. 1972), and continuous citizens' complaints leveled by The Peopl'e 
First, a community organization in Dorchester. The essence of these grievances 
is that Judge Troy discriminates against poor people, particularly Black and 
Spanish-speaking individuals. Examples of these allegedly discriminatory practices 
include conditioning welfare payments upon the recipient's signing of criminal 
non-support compl'aints against her spouse and discriminatory bail setting prac-
tices. See Haley v. Troy, supra. The Troy case is now pending before the Supreme 
Judicial Court following a closed hearing conducted by Judge Franklin Flaschner, 
Chief Justice of the District Courts, and an investigation by a select committee 
of the Boston Bar Association. 
Standards for cases of judicial misconduct will be much clearer in the future 
with the promulgation of Chapter 5, Supreme Judicial Court Rules, the Code of 
Judicial Conduct. See §§24.5-24.7, supra. The new code will only apply to conduct 
occurring after Jan. 1, 1973. It is not clear to what extent it would affect a 
case of conduct occurring before that date. It is interesting to note that one 
addition to the original ABA version of the Code provides that the provisions 
of the Code do not place "any limitation upon the Supreme Judicial Court in 
the exercise of its power of general superintendence whether statutory or inherent, 
in areas not delineated in the Code." 
65 See note 64, supra. 
66 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh, at 89, 279 N.E.2d at 310. 
67 Id. at 90, 279 N.E.2d at 311. 
68 See, e.g., Matter of Ruby, 328 Mass. 542, 105 N.E.2d 234 (1952). 
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the governor was to provide a basis for beginning address or impeach-
ment proceedings. In this respect, the Supreme Judicial Court followed 
the lead of the Michigan Court in Graham69 in distinguishing between 
removal and an injunction which precludes the exercise of judicial powers 
but does not affect tenure or the right to receive pay. Although the sub-
stantive basis for this distinction is questionable, it does offer a means by 
which the Court can achieve the equivalent of removal yet avoid a 
constitutional clash with the other hranches of government over its power 
to do so. 
Interestingly, the Supreme Judicial Court also avoided the use of the 
term "injunction" to describe its order regarding DeSaulnier. The use 
of the word "order" was probably intended to bring its action within 
the scope of G.L., c. 211, §3 which empowers the Court to issue "orders, 
directions and rules" necessary for achieving proper and efficient ad-
ministration of the courts. It may also have wished to avoid a detailed 
discussion of the equity considerations involved in issuing an injunction 
under these circumstances.'o However, the Court's order achieved the 
result which would have flowed from a formal injunction. 
The expeditious relief fashioned by the Court illustrated its view of 
the entire proceedings. It treated the initial investigation, the hearing 
before the full court, and the relief as incident to the general house-
keeping of the courts. Yet, the Court's admission thllt "primary responsi-
bility for removal of judges" rests with the governor and the legislature71 
is some indication of the Court's uneasiness with its newly carved out 
powers. A legislative response to the DeSaulnier decision might be most 
helpful in averting a possible clash between the branches in this area of 
judicial discipline. 
GARY R. GREENBERG 
69 See note 41, supra. 
70 While a detailed discussion of the equity problems is beyond the scope of 
this paper, it is suggested that a careful scrutiny of the adequacy of the avail-
able alternative constitutionar remedies might have caused some uneasiness with 
the issuance of a clear injunction. 
71 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 85, 279 N.E.2d at 308. 
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